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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
1 OVERVIEW
The period elapsed since the publication of the previous Quarterly Report, on 21 December 
last year, has seen the continuation on the financial markets of the phase of risk appetite 
and low volatility that began in early November, following the US election result. These 
developments have been related to expectations of a rise in activity and inflation in the 
United States and, in general, the release of favourable economic indicators in most 
geographical areas. This has led to a rise in share prices and to a relative stability of yields 
on sovereign markets, accompanied, within the euro area, by a modest rise in the spreads 
over Germany, against a background of substantial political uncertainty. Oil prices, which 
had surged in the period immediately following the OPEC output reduction in late November, 
have – conversely – retreated quite considerably in the opening weeks of March. 
Judging by the indicators released during the quarter, which have proven more favourable than 
expected in the advanced and emerging economies alike, the growth of activity in the world 
economy appears to be accelerating in the opening months of the year. The future outlook is 
not free, however, from risks, as is discussed in detail in Box 1. In particular, the current boom 
on financial markets is itself a source of risk, insofar as it might be reflecting excessive 
confidence in the onset of a phase of higher growth and the disappearance of deflationary 
risks. Specifically, these market developments evidence, at least in part, expectations that the 
new US administration will pursue economic policies conducive to higher growth and inflation 
in the short term (and a potential fiscal expansion), apparently underestimating the influence of 
such policies on the pace of US monetary normalisation, along with other more harmful effects 
(such as the shift towards a diminished international mobility of goods and individuals). A 
potential acceleration in the pace of US monetary normalisation might, in particular, reverse 
recent capital inflows into the emerging economies. Among these, the continuation of the 
complex financial conditions in the Chinese economy remains a factor of risk. 
In the euro area, the recent flow of conjunctural information has also generally been positive, 
more visibly so in the qualitative indicators, whereas confirmation from the quantitative 
indicators has not been complete. This information would suggest an improvement in activity, 
albeit in a setting of heightened political uncertainty associated with the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the European Union and with imminent elections in some of the core European 
countries. Despite the rise in oil prices from their early-2016 low, private consumption 
apparently continues to be the driving force of the recovery in the euro area as a whole, a 
recovery increasingly becoming extensive to the different member states. As regards prices, 
the increase in overall inflation is so far not feeding through to core inflation. In any event, this 
acceleration in prices has been conducive to a pick-up in inflation expectations, making the 
possibility of a deflationary spiral more remote. Despite these favourable developments, 
the perception that it is not yet conclusive that inflation will undergo a sustained recovery led 
the ECB Governing Council in March to point out the need to retain the monetary stimuli. 
In Spain, the latest information suggests a continuation of the expansion in activity at a 
rate which, in Q1, is expected to be 0.8% in quarter-on-quarter terms. The recovery 
remains underpinned by the strength of employment, which continues to make for buoyant 
domestic demand. This variable might, however, slow slightly in the short term owing to 
the squeeze on household income induced by the rise in inflation. Against this background, 
the contribution of the net external balance to GDP growth should continue to be positive, 
in the aforementioned setting of strengthening global activity and external market growth. 
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In the medium term, the projections set out in this Quarterly Report confirm the continuation 
of the Spanish economy’s upturn, against the backdrop of the progress made in redressing 
imbalances and, in particular, in enhancing competitiveness. The rate of increase of GDP 
is, however, estimated to slow during the year as a result of higher oil prices and the 
expected neutral fiscal policy stance, following its expansionary gearing in the 2015-2016 
period. Specifically, Spanish GDP is expected to grow 2.8% this year, easing to 2.3% and 
2.1% in the two following years. 
Turning to inflation, there has been a notable rise at the start of the year (up to 3% in 
January and February in terms of the year-on-year change in the CPI). This acceleration, 
in response above all to the strong increase witnessed in electricity prices and to the base 
effects of oil prices, has been sharper than that observed in other euro area economies. It 
is nonetheless expected that, in principle, this rise in inflation will be temporary, and start 
to tail off from the spring as the impact of the acceleration in the energy component fades. 
Thus, after increasing by 2.2% on average in 2017, it is estimated the CPI will slow to 1.3% 
and 1.5% in 2018 and 2019, respectively.
The developments described should be compatible with the continuation of the process to 
restore the main macro-financial equilibria. In this respect, the lower rate of increase of real 
GDP is expected to be offset by an acceleration in the deflator, meaning that nominal GDP 
should continue to grow at a rate somewhat higher than 3.5%, contributing to the ongoing 
deleveraging of the economy. Moreover, the projections shift to a later date, in part, the easing 
that appears to have been recently observed in the Spanish economy’s import dependency. If 
this trend is confirmed, the substitution of domestic output for certain imports would contribute 
to mitigating the adverse impact of the recent hike in oil prices on the external balance which, 
in terms of the nation’s net lending capacity, would hold at a level close to 2% of GDP. It is 
estimated that employment will grow by 2.6% this year and somewhat below 2% in the two 
following years, whereby the unemployment rate would fall to close to 14% at end-2019. 
However, over the projection period public debt is expected to remain at very high levels, 
underscoring the need to resume fiscal consolidation, in order to attain a sustained 
reduction in public debt. This is particularly important both in terms of restoring leeway 
ahead of more adverse future growth scenarios and of reducing the economy’s vulnerability 
to any future tightening of financial conditions. 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rate of change of seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP and of original series in that of consumer price indices.
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The Report contains 7 boxes in total. The first of these presents the Banco de España’s 
new macroeconomic projections. There follows a description of the proposed US corporate 
income tax reform and a discussion of the possible consequences (Box 2). The apparently 
transitory nature of the recent rise in inflation in the euro area (Box 3) and in Spain (Box 4) 
is then assessed. There is a study of the potential impact on jobs and wages in Spain of 
the recent raising of the minimum wage in Box 5, and a further study of the relative weights 
of fixed and variable interest rate mortgages relative to total mortgage lending (and the 
attendant explanatory factors) in Box 6. Finally, Box 7 analyses the causes behind the recent 
dynamism of tourism and the prospect of this continuing in the future.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 24 March 2017.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c Latest available figure for consumer price indices: Febuary 2017.
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MAIN MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a) TABLE 1
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This box describes the main features of the latest update of the 
Banco de España’s macroeconomic projections. Compared with 
the previous projections,1 presented in December 2016, the latest 
ones include the impact of the changes in the technical 
assumptions observed between 17 November 2016 and 23 March 
2017, with the exception of the assumptions relating to 
performance of the external markets where the cut-off date is 
20 February 2017 (see Table 1).2 The projections also incorporate 
all information known since the close of the previous projection 
exercise up to 24 March, including in particular the latest QNA 
(Quarterly National Accounts) estimates up to 2016 Q4.
The current projections envisage continued economic expansion 
in Spain throughout the three-year period 2017-2019. Growth will 
continue to be assisted by the competitive gains obtained since 
the onset of the crisis and the enduring favourable financial 
conditions, underpinned by the accommodative monetary policy 
stance. Together, these factors will allow the process of continued 
job creation to keep progressing. In addition, although some of 
these temporary growth drivers of the last two years, such as low 
oil prices or the expansionary fiscal policy, have tended to reverse, 
their lagged effects are still lending a certain amount of momentum 
to activity in the short term.
Based on our estimates, GDP could rise by 2.8% this year, before 
slipping to more moderate growth rates of 2.3% and 2.1%, 
respectively, in 2018 and 2019 (see Table  2), precisely as the 
effects of those temporary growth drivers wear off. As regards 
consumer prices, it is estimated that the annual rate of change of 
CPI will increase to 2.2% this year, driven by the uptick in the 
energy component that is largely related to the positive base 
effects linked to oil prices, although it is expected to decline 
moderately as the year progresses in line with oil prices on the 
futures markets.3 When these base effects are exhausted at the 
beginning of 2018, the inflation rate will decelerate, to 1.4% in 
2018, before rising slightly again, up to 1.6% in 2019, as a 
consequence of the decrease in cyclical slack in the economy.
Compared with the December 2016 projection exercise, the 
changes in the assumptions on which the projections are based 
are quite modest. The most notable change is the upturn in oil 
prices as a result of the agreements reached between the oil 
producing countries in late November and early December, shortly 
after the cut-off date for the last projections. Although crude prices 
have dropped again recently, the level projected for 2017 is still 
6.3% higher, on average, than the previous projection. 
The changes in the other assumptions are minimal. Specifically, 
the cost of credit financing for the private sector of the economy is 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019)
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 23 March 2017. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated on the basis of 
the related annual averages.
b A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
c For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
International environment
    World output 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 0.1 0.1 0.1
    World markets 1.7 3.5 3.9 3.9 0.4 -0.1 -0.1
0.00.05.06.37.37.32.2stekram tropxe s'niapS    
7.2-6.0-1.39.151.254.250.44)level( srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
20.0-20.0-20.0-70.170.170.111.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Nominal effective exchange rate against the non-euro area (b)
    (2000=100 and percentage differences) 113.6 112.0 112.2 112.2 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0
1.01.00.01.01.0-3.0-3.0-Short-term interest rate (3-month Euribor) (c)    
1.00.01.0-6.22.28.14.1Long-term interest rate (10-year bond yield) (c)    
Difference between current 




INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2016-2019): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2016 
joint projection exercise.
2  The projections for the external markets (and for competitors’ prices in 
their national currency) are taken from the March 2017 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
3  The reversal of a temporary increase in electricity prices at the beginning 
of the year also plays a key role in the gradual decline projected over the 
course of the year (see Box 4).
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expected to be very similar to that envisaged in the December 
2016 projection exercise, in keeping with the steady paths traced 
by interbank market rates and government debt yields over the 
past quarter. Nor is the expected growth of Spain’s export markets 
over the projection period significantly different from that considered 
in the previous projections. The changes are somewhat greater in 
the case of competitors’ prices, which are expected to grow at a 
slightly higher pace than that envisaged in the December exercise, 
in line with the moderate depreciation in the euro exchange rate 
observed since then, and in relation to the fiscal policy 
assumptions.
The most significant change in the fiscal ambit is the inclusion of 
the changes in corporate income tax legislation contained in the 
package of extraordinary tax measures approved on 2 December 
2016 by the Council of Ministers (Royal Decree-Law 3/2016) and 
ratified by Parliament on 15 December. Specifically, the government 
has quantified the impact of these measures, which seek to 
broaden the corporate income tax base (limiting tax losses and 
double taxation tax credit, reversing asset value impairment and 
placing limits on the ability to deduct own funds losses), at close 
to 0.5  pp of GDP. In addition, the measures approved include 
higher excise duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
and an increase in the maximum contribution base to the Social 
Security system.
At the cut-off date for the projection assumptions (which, as 
indicated above, was 23 March), the draft State and Social Security 
Budget for 2017 had not been submitted; the draft budget was finally 
approved by the Council of Ministers on 31 March.4 Accordingly, like 
the December projections, these projections do not include the 
content of the draft budget. In consequence, also as in December, 
various technical assumptions have been used to estimate the tax 
variables. First, it has been assumed that the budget headings 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
Difference between current and 
December 2016 forecasts
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1.0-1.0-5.06.14.12.22.0-)IPC( xedni ecirp remusnoC
CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy  0.8 1.1 1.5 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.0
1.02.03.08.19.16.29.2)sboj tnelaviuqe( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (percentage of the labour force).
End-of-period data 18.6 16.7 15.4 13.9 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5
Unemployment rate (percentage of the labour force).
Average data 19.6 17.5 16.0 14.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
Net lending (+)/ net borrowing (-) of the nation (% of GDP) 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
General government net lending (+)/ net borrowing (-) (% of GDP) (b) -4.5 -3.3 -2.8 -2.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
March 2017 projections
Table 2
PROJECTION OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACROECONOMIC MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and as a % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure: 2016 Q4.
a Projections cut-off date: 24 March 2017.
b Does not include information on the draft State Budget for 2017 as it was submitted after the projections cut-off date.
4  The draft was submitted, therefore, between the cut-off date for the 
information used and the publication date of this Report, meaning that it 
was not possible to include the contents in the projections. In any event, 
the draft budget may naturally undergo changes in its passage through 
parliament.
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subject to greater scope for discretion, notably including, by virtue of 
their volume, public investment and procurement, evolve in keeping 
with the nominal potential growth of the Spanish economy;5 and 
second, that all other general government account items evolve, in 
the absence of measures, in keeping with their habitual determinants. 
Specifically, in the case of public revenue, irrespective of the inclusion 
of the legislative changes approved at end-2016, it has been 
assumed that it will grow in keeping with its tax bases, which chiefly 
depend on the macroeconomic environment. Likewise the 
expenditure items that offer less scope for discretion, such as 
pensions (where developments are essentially determined by the 
revaluation formula established by law, and by population ageing), 
unemployment benefits (which primarily depend on developments in 
unemployment) and the interest burden (affected by changes in 
government debt levels and interest rates).
Overall, it is estimated that the changes observed in the 
assumptions used in these and the December projections, 
considered in isolation, will result in a small upward revision in the 
rate of growth of GDP over the projection horizon. In the case of 
inflation, the new trajectory of oil prices dominates the revisions 
prompted by the changes in the assumptions. Prices have been 
revised up in 2017, in keeping with the higher crude prices on the 
spot markets compared with the levels considered in the December 
projections. However, for 2018 and 2019 the slope of the oil price 
curve on the futures markets has flattened somewhat; this will 
result in smaller percentage increases than envisaged in the 
December assumptions and, therefore, in a more moderate 
consumer price performance.
Nevertheless, although compared with the projections published 
in early December the positive impact on activity of the change in 
assumptions is very limited, GDP growth has been revised up by a 
larger amount (specifically by 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 pp, respectively, in 
2017, 2018 and 2019). The revision in the first half of 2017 is 
explained by the latest conjunctural information which points to a 
more upbeat pace of activity in the opening months of the year 
than projected in December. Notable in this respect are the 
strength of the survey-based soft data and of the monthly Social 
Security registrations in the first two months of 2017.
The revision made beyond the short-term is backed by two 
considerations. First, as indicated earlier, the assumptions relating 
to the performance of the external markets were prepared by ECB 
staff on the information available up to 20 February 2017, so they 
do not include the conjunctural information on the performance of 
the world economy released after that date and which, as indicated 
in Section 2 of this Report, is predominantly positive. Looking 
forward, this suggests that global activity and trade will both be 
stronger than was envisaged in the assumptions used in the 
projection exercise, prompting a more favourable assessment of 
the Spanish economy’s external markets and, therefore, an 
upward revision of Spanish export growth.
Second, competitiveness gains have been a key factor in the story 
of the economic upturn, but although they have played a crucial 
role in export sales, there was no clear proof that they had resulted 
in any import substitution. However, the latest QNA data, together 
with the microeconomic evidence available, are beginning to 
provide increasing signs that incipient import substitution is now 
under way. Accordingly, in this projection exercise, a somewhat 
less dynamic import performance than would derive from its 
traditional relationship with final demand has been considered.
As regards the composition of GDP on the demand side, it is 
estimated that GDP growth will essentially continue to be 
underpinned by the contribution of domestic demand, even 
though the slowdown in domestic demand observed in 2016 is 
expected to continue. Net external demand should continue to 
make a positive contribution to the increase in GDP over the entire 
projection horizon.
Among the components of domestic demand, in 2017 private 
consumption will be shaped by the decline in the rate of growth of 
households’ real income, in a setting of higher inflation caused by 
the higher rates of change in the energy component. In this 
respect, the high-frequency indicators have started to point to the 
first signs of slowdown. However, as in the recent past, low interest 
rates, household wealth revaluation and, especially, the strength 
of job creation will continue to play an important role underpinning 
consumption. Given the duration of these factors and the 
temporary nature (in principle) of the rise in inflation, it is estimated 
that households will soften the impact on their real income in 
2017, offsetting it in part by reducing their saving rate. In the rest 
of the projection horizon, household consumption is expected to 
grow at a slightly lower rate than household income, providing for 
a modest readjustment of saving. In consequence, consumption 
would increase by 2.4% in 2017 (0.8 pp less than in 2016), slowing 
to 1.6% in 2018 and 1.5% in 2019.
The high-frequency data on housing starts and housing market 
transactions point to a continuation of the gradual improvement in 
residential investment, which is expected to persist over the entire 
projection horizon on the back of a positive employment 
performance and the expectation that credit conditions will remain 
favourable and that housing prices will rise. As in recent years, 
however, the pace of the recovery is expected to be unequal 
across the country, stronger in the main cities and in the more 
tourism-oriented regions, although the latest figures available 
would seem to suggest that demand may decline somewhat in 
these regions as a consequence of the Brexit process. In any 
event, there has been no change in the assessment made in 
previous projection exercises that the scale of the strengthening of 
this demand component will be mitigated by the relatively low rate 
of new household formation.
Firms’ expenditure on capital goods fell in the second half of 2016, 
most likely influenced by the negative impact of the new corporate 
income tax rules on firms’ cash flows. The new rules provided, 
among other measures, for the reintroduction of (and increase in) 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
5  On the latest in-house estimates, nominal potential growth will be 
around 2% in 2017 and slightly below 2.5% in 2018.
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minimum advance payments (in September) and a reduction in the 
limit on the offset of tax losses and a limit on tax credits to prevent 
international double taxation (in December). In the short term, 
investment by non-financial corporations is expected to grow 
moderately, driven by the continuation of these effects, although 
their impact will be predominantly temporary as in the main they 
are advance payments rather than a genuine increase in the tax 
burden. In a favourable setting for borrowing and against a 
backdrop of strong final demand, business investment, after 
slowing in 2017, is expected to pick up again thereafter.
In 2016 exports performed extremely well, posting a rate of growth 
that was significantly higher than that of the markets themselves and 
than that of euro area exports overall, assisted by the positive 
development of the tourism services component (see Box 7). Exports 
have been revised up for the projection period, in keeping with their 
recent favourable performance, with higher competitiveness gains 
relative to the rest of the world than in the previous forecasts and, 
especially, considering the favourable assessment of the 
performance of the external markets since the cut-off date for the 
information relating to this assumption (which, as indicated above, 
was 20 February). As regards the tourism component, the medium-
term projection assumes no further increase over the projection 
period of the part of the recent flow of foreign visitors that is a 
consequence of heightened insecurity in certain alternative 
destinations. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the projections relating 
to imports incorporate the assessment that evidence is starting to 
emerge of an incipient process of import substitution, as yet of 
modest proportions, as a result of the competitive adjustment 
undertaken by the economy since the onset of the crisis.
Spain will continue to be a net lender to the rest of the world over the 
projection period. However, in 2017 the Spanish economy’s surplus 
is expected to contract by 0.2 pp of GDP compared with the 2016 
figure, as a consequence of higher oil prices, reaching 1.9% of GDP. 
For the following years it is estimated that the net lending position 
will hold steady around that level, in a setting in which a further 
deterioration in the terms of trade would offset the impact of the 
positive contribution of net exports to GDP growth.
Turning to the labour market, the projections envisage that 
employment generation will continue at a strong pace, giving rise 
to quite moderate increases in apparent labour productivity, in 
accordance with past experience of economic expansion in 
Spain.6 Wage growth is expected to remain moderate, against the 
backdrop of a temporary rise in inflation in 2017, keeping unit 
labour costs contained and thus helping to sustain the process of 
employment creation. The increase in the employment rate will 
prompt a further decline in the unemployment rate, which by the 
end of the projection horizon is expected to be around 14%.
The rise in inflation, measured by the year-on-year rate of change 
in the CPI, observed since spring 2016 has gathered momentum in 
recent months, up to 3% in January and February (see Box 4). This 
is a consequence of the acceleration in the energy component, 
while the rate of growth of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and 
energy has continued to move, as it has since mid-2015, within a 
narrow band around a level just below 1%. On the assumptions 
underpinning these projections (and, in particular, given the 
expected trajectory of oil prices), the rates of change of the energy 
component should have peaked, decelerating as from March. In 
addition, it is assumed that, in line with past experience, the pass-
through of higher crude (and electricity) prices to other prices in the 
economy and to wages will be modest, so the non-energy CPI 
should be scarcely affected. In this setting, it is estimated that the 
CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy will gradually rise, 
from 1.1% in 2017 to 1.8% in 2019, as the output gap gradually 
narrows and unit labour costs gradually rise. In turn, the rate of 
change of overall CPI is expected to accelerate to an average of 
2.2% in 2017, as a consequence of the performance of the energy 
component, before decelerating to 1.4% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. 
The expected trajectory of energy prices, with slightly negative 
fluctuations in 2018 and 2019 as a result of the path expected to be 
followed by oil prices according to the futures markets, also 
explains the positive gap between core inflation, measured by the 
rate of change of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy, 
and overall inflation towards the end of the projection horizon.7
The risks surrounding these GDP growth projections are mainly on 
the downside. The sources of risk arise particularly in the Spanish 
economy’s external context. Specifically, the recent positive trend 
in the financial markets seems to be discounting the start of a 
phase of higher growth and a disappearance of deflation risks, 
which may not be entirely founded. The current market buoyancy 
partly reflects the expectations that an expansionary fiscal policy 
will be implemented in the United States. However, this may either 
not be fully achieved, or may, through its possible interference with 
that country’s monetary normalisation process, cause a reversal of 
recent capital flows into emerging economies.
In this regard, since last summer yields on securities traded on 
developed countries’ sovereign debt markets have begun to rise, 
although it is still too early to determine what underlies this recent 
upward trend in interest rates or how far it will go. However, possible 
further tightening of the yield curve, particularly if it is sudden, could 
cause shocks on the financial markets, which, as mentioned, could, 
in particular, lead to an outflow of capital from those emerging 
economies with the highest levels of foreign currency debt, 
undermining activity in those countries and, consequently, demand 
for Spanish exports. Moreover, given the Spanish economy’s high 
level of debt and its substantial foreign financing needs, the possible 
start of an upward cycle in interest rates could have a negative impact 
on some agents’ income and the strength of their balance sheets.
The tendency to introduce protectionist barriers has also recently 
gained strength in some developed economies. The materialisation 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
6  Box 5 analyses the potential impact of the recently approved increase in 
the national minimum wage.
7  A difference that is also attributable, in part, to the projected slowdown, 
from the current high rates of growth, in the unprocessed food component.
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of these incipient trends would have an adverse effect on global 
trade, which could be particularly detrimental to economies such 
as Spain’s, whose recovery has relied heavily on export growth 
and which is still in the process of correcting its external imbalance.
Additionally, much uncertainty remains about the possible 
implications of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, in a context 
in which the duration and outcome of the bilateral negotiations are 
as yet unknown. In this regard, the most recent data show little 
sign of any specific negative impact of the depreciation in sterling 
on the Spanish economy, except in the case of house purchases 
by British nationals, which slowed in the second half of 2016. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the uncertainty over the 
final shape of the relationship between the EU and the United 
Kingdom while negotiations are under way, or a potential negative 
effect on volumes of goods and services transactions once 
negotiations have been concluded, could have an adverse effect 
on Britain’s imports from other European countries, which in 
Spain’s case, could be exacerbated by the high level of exposure 
of its tourism and non-tourism service exports.8
Meanwhile the Chinese authorities are facing a difficult balancing 
act as they try to support activity by means of credit expansion, 
while seeking to rein in high levels of financial and non-financial 
private sector debt. A hypothetical disorderly correction of the 
imbalances over the projection horizon could put China’s financial 
stability at risk and cause a sharp downturn in the country’s 
activity, with adverse effects for the global economy as a whole.
Finally, the recent fragile growth in activity in some euro area 
countries has caused a weakening of some financial institutions’ 
profitability. If this situation were to become more pronounced or 
excessively prolonged, it could have adverse impacts on their 
capacity to extend credit and, ultimately, on the stability of some 
parts of the European financial system, with the consequent 
negative impact on borrowing conditions and agents’ confidence.
On the domestic front, last November a new government was 
formed following a lengthy caretaker period. This has reduced the 
risks associated with the potential negative impact of the 
provisional status of the executive branch on legislative activity, 
and on the budgetary process in particular. However, the 
uncertainty has not been entirely dispelled, given the lack of a 
stable parliamentary majority. In this regard, it should be recalled 
that the improvement in the Spanish economy’s medium and long-
term outlook for growth in activity and employment still relies on 
various structural reforms being pursued further. Any delay in 
implementing these reforms, or a possible reversal of those 
introduced since the start of the crisis, could have a negative 
effect on investor confidence in the Spanish economy and harm 
growth prospects.
In the fiscal policy sphere, the outstanding adjustment needed to 
restore the public finances to health is still significant. This is 
despite the current context of rapid growth in activity and low 
interest rates, highlighting the need to return to the path of 
budgetary consolidation, taking advantage of the current relatively 
favourable conditions to reduce the structural government deficit 
and public-debt-to-GDP ratio. A budgetary plan of this kind can 
entail costs in terms of short-term economic growth. However, it is 
necessary to moderate future financial costs associated with the 
public debt, reduce the economy’s vulnerability to a potential 
tightening of financial conditions and restore a degree of flexibility 
to fiscal policy so it can respond to possible shocks. 
Lastly, the historical evidence seems to suggest that the extent to 
which price changes in the energy component are passed through 
to wages and other prices in the economy would be relatively 
modest, in both Spain and the euro area. Nevertheless, due to the 
higher degree of energy dependence (see Box 4), and the presence 
of indexation clauses in collective bargaining agreements (despite 
their significant reduction in recent years; see Box 5), the Spanish 
economy may be more prone than its euro area partners to 
generate indirect and second-round inflationary effects on 
consumer prices and wages. Against this backdrop, the priority 
remains averting the risk of the recent upturn in inflation having a 
bigger spillover effect on labour costs and final prices in Spain 
than in other euro area countries, as this would cause a partial 
reversal of the competitiveness gains achieved in recent years.
The balance of risks regarding inflation is also moderately negative. 
On the external front, the downside risks derive from the possible 
materialisation of the negative events identified in relation to 
activity. From the domestic standpoint, the accumulated evidence 
from the past two years indicates persistent difficulty in translating 
a reduction in the cyclical slack in the economy into more dynamic 
price behaviour. This suggests that the anticipated upturn in the 
CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy over the projection 
period as a consequence of the additional increase in the degree 
of utilisation of the economy’s resources may not fully materialise. 
Lastly, as discussed above, a risk of the opposite sign would be 
the possibility that the recent oil price rise be passed on to prices 
of other goods and services more strongly than suggested by the 
historical evidence. More generally, the partial reversal in early 
March of last autumn’s oil price rise, against the backdrop of 
doubts as to how the various market suppliers will act, adds an 
extra element of uncertainty to these inflation projections.
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
8  See Box 5 in the Banco de España’s September 2016 Quarterly report 
on the Spanish economy.
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Last June the Republican majority in the United States House of 
Representatives presented a plan for an overhaul of the country’s tax 
system. The feature of the plan that has sparked off most debate is 
the reform of corporate income tax.1 Enacting the proposals for this 
tax would result in a radical shift in philosophy, turning this tax into a 
destination-based cash-flow tax (DBCFT), levied on cash flow 
generated by companies’ operations in the United States.2
The plan aims to simplify the existing corporate income tax and 
eliminate the alleged discrimination against goods manufactured 
in the United States by countries whose tax systems include a 
form of value-added tax (VAT).3 Key features of the reform are:
— The new tax would be levied on the cash flow generated by 
companies in the United States, with no deduction for purchases 
from non-residents (imports) but excluding income from sales to 
non-residents (exports) from taxable income. Corporate income 
tax is currently levied on US companies’ profits regardless of 
where they are generated, although taxes on profits paid in other 
countries can be deducted in the United States.
— Reduction of the federal tax rate from 35% to 20%. The current 
rate is one of the highest among OECD countries, although there 
are numerous exemptions (such that the effective rate is 28.1%)4, 
5 and is not applicable to many businesses whose owners opt for 
their income to be taxed under personal income tax.
— Immediate total deduction (expensing) of the cost of capital 
investments. Nevertheless, deductions for capital goods acquired 
in the past that remain pending depreciation and amortisation 
would continue to be governed by the existing rules.
— Elimination of the deductibility of interest payments on all new 
loans. Consequently, interest on outstanding debt would continue 
to be deductible. The aim would be for funding decisions to be 
determined on the basis of economic rather than fiscal reasons.
— Limitation of the deduction for losses to 90% of taxable 
income, rather than the current 100%, with the possibility of 
indefinite carry forwards, updated at an appropriate rate. Also, 
elimination of all deductions, except those for R&D expenditure.
— Repatriation of accumulated foreign profits at a tax rate of 8.75% 
on cash profits or 3.5% on other profits, with the liability payable 
over eight years. It is estimated that US subsidiaries currently 
hold some $2 trillion in profits abroad. If companies decided to 
repatriate these profits under current legislation they would have 
to pay a tax rate of 35%, deducting taxes paid in the country in 
which the profits were generated from this amount.
Table 1 shows the estimate of the static6 effect of this proposal on 
tax revenues over the coming decade (according to calculations 
by the Tax Policy Center)7 broken down by the different aspects of 
the reform. The most significant impacts come from the revenue 
shortfall caused by the lower tax rate and the increase in revenue 
due to the “border adjustment”, resulting from the fact that as the 
United States has a trade deficit, the increased revenues from 
taxes on imports would outweigh the drop in revenue caused by 
excluding exports from the tax base. The effect of eliminating the 
deductibility of interest is relatively modest as it only affects new 
debt and the calculations refer to the coming decade. On these 
estimates, the total net effect on tax revenues would be negative.
There is considerable uncertainty, however, as to whether the plan 
will ultimately be enacted, as it may lack sufficient support in the 
US congress. The plan also faces other obstacles: the highly 
heterogeneous effects on specific sectors may in some cases be 
negative, and parts of it may be on a collision course with World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
To illustrate the controversy raised by the proposal in the US 
business world, due to the widely varying effects the reform could 
have on different types of companies, Table 2 shows the estimated 
static impact on post-tax profits and the taxes collected in two 
extreme hypothetical cases: a company highly dependent on 
imported inputs selling entirely to the domestic market, and an 
export-driven firm that does not buy inputs from abroad. Assuming 
that exchange rates remain constant, changes in post-tax profits 
show how the Republican proposal adversely affects imported 
goods, whose total value is considered taxable. By contrast, wage 
costs are tax deductible in the case of goods produced in the 
United States and exports are also excluded from the tax.8 As a 
result, the hardest-hit companies would be those manufacturing 
BOX 2THE UNITED STATES CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM PLAN 
1  Among other measures, the reform also envisages changes to personal 
income tax, establishing three tax brackets instead of the current seven, and 
cutting the top tax rate from 39.6% to 33%. Half of all income from interest 
and dividends, as well as capital gains, would be exempt, and the top rate on 
this form of income would be 16.5%, instead of the 23.8% currently applicable 
to dividends and capital gains, and the 43.4% applicable to interest payments.
2  The source usually cited as the inspiration for this proposal is A. Auerbach 
(2010), “A modern corporate tax”, Center for American Progress/The 
Hamilton Project.
3  The United States tax system does not envisage a tax equivalent to VAT. 
All states (except five) and some local governments collect taxes on the 
sale of final goods and services.
4  Seehttp://www.actontaxreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
International-Comparison-of-Effective-Corporate-Tax-Rates_
FINAL_20160926.pdf, which includes a comparison of various studies 
on effective corporate income tax rates. The figure mentioned in the text 
comes from a study by the World Bank using 2014 data.
5  Some states have also established a complementary corporate income 
tax, which, according to 2012 estimates by the OECD, raises the 
effective federal tax rate by 4.1 pp.
6  The concept of «static effect» refers to the case where economic agents 
do not react to policy changes. This criterion is commonly used by the 
US Congressional Budget Office as a starting point in its analysis of the 
impact of legislative changes.
7  The Tax Policy Center is a think-tank that aims to provide independent 
analyses of tax issues. Document available at: http://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000923-An-Analysis-
of-the-House-GOP-Tax-Plan.pdf.
8  The World Trade Organization allows the use of border adjustments for 
indirect taxes, such as VAT, but not for direct taxes, such as corporate 
income tax. Therefore, numerous cases could be brought before the 
WTO by other countries on the basis of unequal treatment of the costs 
of internal and external inputs. Some countries may also opt to raise 
tariffs on US products.
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BOX 2 THE UNITED STATES CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM PLAN (cont’d)
Current legislation Republican proposal
%02%53etar xaT
Effect on tax revenue (10 years, $ billion) -1,850
tiforp ynapmoc latot/oNesab xat/tnemtsujda redroB
Cost of imported goods non-
deductible and export revenue 
excluded/cash flow
Effect on tax revenue (10 years, $ billion) +1,200
Profits abroad after entry into force 
of proposal (tax rate)
35% upon repatriation (taxes paid 
where subsidiary is located tax 
deductible)
0%
Effect on tax revenue (10 years, $ billion) -90
Repatriation of retained foreign earnings built 
up before entry into force of proposal (tax rate)
35% upon repatriation (taxes paid 
where subsidiary is located tax 
deductible)
8.75% on liquidity positions; 
3.5% on remainder
Effect on tax revenue (10 years, $ billion) 140
New capital expenditure
(Accelerated) depreciation over 
several years
100% depreciation at time of 
investment
Effect on tax revenue (10 years, $ billion) -450
seYoNsnoitpmexe fo noitanimilE
Effect on tax revenue (10 years, $ billion) 170
Net effect
Effect on tax revenue (10 years, $ billion) -880
Table 1  
COMPARISON BETWEEN REPUBLICAN PROPOSAL AND CURRENT CORPORATE INCOME TAX LEGISLATION AND EFFECTS 
ON TAX REVENUE
















)VI – III – II + I( )%53 = etar xat( xat emocni etaroproc tnerruC
Manufacturing
exporter 400  600  1,000  0  800  200  70  130  
Retail importer 1,000  0  1,000  400  400  200  70  130  
)VI – III – II + I( )%02 = etar xat htiw tub( xat emocni etaroproc tnerruC
Manufacturing
exporter 400  600  1,000  0  800  200  40  160  
Retail importer 1,000  0  1,000  400  400  200  40  160  
)VI – I( )%02 = etar xat( lasoporp nacilbupeR
Manufacturing
exporter 400  600  1,000  0  800  -400  -80  280  
Retail importer 1,000  0  1,000  400  400  600  120  80  
Table 2 
EXAMPLE UNDER DIFFERENT CORPORATE INCOME TAX REGIMES AND FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF FIRMS 
(MANUFACTURING EXPORTERS AND RETAIL IMPORTERS)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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products with a large import content and low proportion of wage 
costs, such as those in the automotive sector.
The anticipated effect of the introduction of this corporate income 
tax on the exchange rate is also a matter of considerable debate. 
Some people think that this measure could cause the dollar to rise 
by as much as the tax rate,9 such that companies’ costs would 
remain unchanged. In this case, there would be no competitiveness 
gains associated with changes in the terms of trade or any sector-
specific differences in impact. However, although it is not the 
same type of tax, past experience from the introduction of VAT in 
certain countries has showed that adjustments in the nominal 
exchange rate are not immediate and prices are affected over the 
relatively long term.10 There may, therefore, be transitory 
competitiveness gains that might improve the trade balance and, 
possibly, lead to a degree of sectoral reallocation of activity. This 
is without taking into account possible trade retaliation by other 
countries under the aegis of the WTO.
BOX 2 THE UNITED STATES CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM PLAN (cont’d)
9  For example, let us suppose that the exchange rate between the dollar 
and the euro is parity ($1/€1) and that an importer purchases a product 
outside the United States at a price of €1. As a result of the tax the cost 
for the importer would be $1.2 (given that the tax rate is 20%). For the 
price to remain the same in dollar terms, the exchange rate would 
therefore need to rise to $0.83/€1.
10  See C. Freund y J. Gagnon (2017), “Consumption taxes, real exchange 
rates, and trade balance”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/gagnon20170201ppt.pdf.
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Following a long period of very low inflation rates, the pace of 
price increases in the euro area has stepped up notably in recent 
months, taking inflation to 2% in February. From the standpoint of 
monetary policy, and its medium-term inflation objective of close 
to but below 2%, it is crucial to disentangle the determinants of 
these developments and, in the words of the ECB president, to 
ascertain the extent to which this increase is self-sustaining, i.e. 
whether it would persist in the medium term, in a scenario in which 
the strong monetary stimulus introduced by the ECB in recent 
years were not required. 
As can be seen in Chart 1, which depicts the contribution of the 
different components to the increase in the inflation rate since 
2016, the recent dynamics would be attributable to two factors: 
first, the so-called comparison (or base) effects, namely the 
comparison with the abnormally low oil prices prevailing in early 
2016; and further, certain surprises in the performance of the most 
volatile price components, in particular energy and food. In 
contrast with this behaviour, the least volatile inflation components 
have continued to post moderate and relatively stable growth. 
The comparison effects largely explain both the recent behaviour 
and expected future pattern of euro area inflation in the coming 
months, whereby prices are estimated to grow at a rate close to 
2% during the first half of 2017, to fall back subsequently, if there 
are no further surprises, to rates of around 1.5% (see Chart 2). 
In the medium term several factors reinforce the idea that the current 
rise might be eminently transitory. Firstly, the increase in energy 
costs and the more recent depreciation of the euro have admittedly 
prompted an increase in the costs borne by firms in the early stages 
of production; but the pass-through of these pressures to producer 
and consumer prices appears to be very limited at present (see 
Chart 3). According to purchasing manager surveys, these dynamics 
would be in response to the fact that they still believe the situation to 
be one of moderate demand in a highly competitive environment. 
Secondly, wage restraint remains prevalent in the euro area, even 
in those economies further along the cycle. The econometric 
models available – based mainly on the Phillips curve notion of 
wages, which positively relates wages with some measure of the 
economy’s cyclical position – suggests that this restraint will 
continue for some time, in an environment in which the degree of 
slack still present in European labour markets will foreseeably 
diminish only at a very gradual pace (see Chart 4). Other factors 
also suggest that the risk of the rise in oil prices giving rise to 
second-round effects is limited at present. Hence, according to 
the data gathered by the ESCB Wage Dynamics Network1, the 
number of firms that include indexation clauses in their collective 
bargaining agreements has fallen considerably across the whole 
of the euro area. For instance, in the case of France, the proportion 
of firms that adapted their wages to inflation before 2010 stood at 
53%, while during the 2010-2013 period this percentage, 
according to the WDN, fell to 41.5%, mainly because collective 
agreements did not contain an indexation clause. 
Finally, the indicators of inflation expectations estimated on the 
basis of market data are still consistent with relatively slow 
convergence towards levels closer to the medium-term reference 
of 2% (see Chart 5). It is nonetheless true that the rise in these 
indicators since last summer suggests that the risk of deflationary 
scenarios has declined considerably. 
To conclude, there are two factors underpinning recent inflation 
dynamics: a leading component, the so-called base effects arising 
from the downward dynamics of oil prices in early 2016; and the 
surprises that have positively affected the prices of the most 
volatile components of the index. In the absence of second-round 
effects, which, moreover, may be expected to be limited in the 
current context of moderate growth and the persistence of a 
negative output gap, these factors are of an eminently transitory 
nature and, therefore, have very limited implications for the 
inflation outlook in the medium term, this term being the relevant 
one from the monetary policy standpoint to assess the price 
stability objective. This is duly reflected in the ECB’s new 
forecasting exercise, which revises the December exercise’s 
short-term inflation forecasts but holds the inflation levels for 2018 
and 2019 at very similar levels to those projected at the end of last 
year (1.8% and 1.7%, respectively). 
BOX 3 THE RISE IN INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA
1  See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/research-networks/
html/researcher_wdn.en.html.
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BOX 3 THE RISE IN INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a 6-month moving average.
b 2-quarter moving average.
c 5-day moving average.
d January 2017 for the monthly series, 2016 Q3 for the quarterly series and 16 February 2017 for the daily series.
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Inflation in Spain – proxied by the growth rate of the consumer 
price index (CPI) – has quickened notably in recent months. 
Specifically, in February 2017 it stood at 3%, up 4.1 pp on the April 
2016 figure, the minimum rate for last year, and significantly higher 
than the averages for the last three years, in which the CPI posted 
negative rates of change. 
To analyse inflation in recent years it is worth making an accounting 
decomposition of the annual CPI rate, distinguishing between the 
contributions to the overall index of, on one hand, the prices of 
energy products and, on the other, the contribution of other goods 
and services. As can be seen in Chart 1, the negative rate of 
change of the overall index from December 2014 to August 2016 
is due, above all, to the downward trajectory of the energy 
component, while the contribution of the other products is positive. 
In this respect, the change in the overall index excluding energy 
moved on a slightly rising trajectory in recent years, posting 
increases of 0.7% and 0.9% on average in 2015 and 2016, 
respectively, and of 1.3% in February 2017. 
The path of oil prices over the course of 2016, which feeds into the 
energy component of the CPI, largely helps explain the increase 
observed in the year-on-year rate of the overall CPI in the opening 
months of 2017, and why a subsequent slowdown over the rest of 
the year is expected. As Chart 2 shows, the level of oil prices 
touched bottom in the opening months of 2016, increasing 
thereafter, in particular in the closing months of the year, following 
the agreement by OPEC and other producers to reduce supply. 
However, based on futures market prices, oil is expected to 
stabilise at levels similar to current ones over the rest of 2017 
(dotted line in Chart 2). This price pattern makes for a path of year-
on-year rates in 2017 that peaks early in the year, and slows 
substantially in the following months (see Chart 2 once again), 
depicting what is known as a comparison effect1 (or base effect). 
Given the high speed of transmission of crude oil price movements 
to those of oil derivatives, such as petrol and diesel, this moderation 
would likewise affect the year-on-year change in the energy 
component of the CPI. The overall index, meanwhile, also 
ultimately follows this profile. 
Chart 3 shows a decomposition of the year-on-year rate of the 
overall CPI which highlights the significance of the comparison 
BOX 4 INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK IN SPAIN
SOURCES: INE, Reuters and Banco de España.
a The dotted lines depict the forecasts.
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1  Banco de España (2016) “The recent rise in inflation in Spain and the 
short-term outlook”. Box 3. Quarterly report on the Spanish economy. 
December.
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effect when explaining the rise witnessed in January-February, 
along with the subsequent slowdown projected for the rest of 
2017. In 2018, once this effect has petered out, the overall CPI is 
expected to stand below 1.5%. 
Beyond these significant direct effects that crude oil price dynamics 
exert on the overall CPI, the evidence available to date for the 
Spanish economy suggests that their possible pass-through to the 
prices of non-energy products, i.e. indirect2 and second-round3 
effects, would be limited.4 In the specific case of wages, the risk of 
an increase in oil prices giving rise to second-round effects might be 
limited at this point in time. In particular, on the evidence provided by 
the ESCB Wage Dynamics Network5, the number of firms with 
indexation clauses in their collective bargaining agreements has 
fallen during the crisis. Similarly, the proportion of workers covered 
by this type of clause in agreements signed in 2016 stood at 20%6, 
compared with figures of close to 70% ten years ago. 
In any event, although the empirical evidence to date does not 
reveal notable indirect and second-round effects, it cannot be 
ruled out that these may arise at some point, especially if there 
are further upward oil price shocks. In this respect, since Spain is 
a net oil importer, a rise in price for this commodity represents an 
income transfer from Spanish households and firms to foreign 
producers. Accordingly, any attempt through price and wage 
increases to avoid the adjustment to real incomes that the higher 
oil price entails will lead to persistently higher inflation rates, with 
the subsequent loss of competitiveness, employment and activity. 
Against this background, the consumer price differential 
between Spain and the euro area has widened recently, turning 
positive since December last year. This differential increases in 
tandem with oil prices as a result of two factors. First, oil 
derivatives have a greater weight in the Spanish household 
consumption basket relative to the related products in the euro 
area. And further, the tax burden of oil derivatives is less in Spain 
than in the euro area, essentially because of the lower specific 
duties involved, which are of a fixed amount. This means that, in 
the face of a given change in the cost of this commodity, public 
sale prices of oil products react to a greater extent in Spain than 
in the euro area. 
Finally, Chart 4 shows forecasts for core inflation (CPI excluding 
energy and unprocessed food)7 for the coming months, which 
suggest a continuation of the very gradual growing trend of 
recovery posted by this indicator in the most recent period. This 
would be consistent with the continuation of the upturn in the 
Spanish economy, which would entail a progressive closing of the 
output gap and a reduction in unemployment during 2017, and 
with a modest increase in unit labour costs, under the assumption 
that indirect and second-round effects are moderate, in step with 
past patterns. 
BOX 4 INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK IN SPAIN (cont’d)
2  Indirect effects are those induced by changes in firms’ marginal costs 
owing to a change in oil prices. 
3  Consumer price changes derived from direct and indirect effects may 
entail revisions of agents’ inflation expectations, which feed through to 
final prices, as a result of the determination of margins or wage bargaining. 
4  In this respect, the simulations conducted with the Quarterly 
Macroeconomic Model of the Banco de España (MTBE) show that the 
influence on core inflation of changes in oil prices is very limited, which is 
consistent with modest indirect effects of crude oil price changes on 
inflation. For a fuller description of the evidence available, see Álvarez, L.J.; 
S. Hurtado; I.  Sánchez and C. Thomas (2011), “The impact of oil price 
changes on Spanish and euro area consumer price inflation” in  Economic 
Modelling 28 (1-2) pp. 422-431, and Hurtado, S.; P. Manzano, E. Ortega 
and A. Urtasun (2014), “Update and re-estimation of the Quarterly Model of 
Banco de España” in Occasional Paper No. 1403, Banco de España.
5  See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/research-networks/
html/researcher_wdn.en.html.
6  In the first two months of 2017, the cumulative figure would be 26.8%.
7  The CPI forecasting procedures used are described in L. J. Álvarez and 
I. Sánchez (2017), “A suite of inflation forecasting models”, Occasional 
Paper No. 1703, Banco de España.
NOTE: This box was published on the Banco de España website on 30 March 2017.
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In early 2017, the government approved an 8% rise in the national 
minimum wage, bringing it to €707.6 per month (from €655.2), in 
14 monthly payments. Moreover, on 22 November 2016, the 
Spanish Congress agreed to consider a legislative proposal on a 
phased increase of the national minimum wage to €800 per month 
by 1 January 2018 and €950 per month by 1 January 2020. This 
box aims to analyse the possible effects of these rises on 
employment and the wage structure.
The existence of a mandatory minimum wage below which 
employment contracts cannot be entered into is widespread 
among developed countries, the main aim being to enhance social 
equity. From a strictly economic standpoint, however, the 
theoretical literature emphasises that a minimum wage can also 
have an adverse impact on employment for certain groups of 
workers, especially those whose productivity level is below the 
minimum wage set by the authorities. Although the empirical 
evidence and the wide variety of findings available on the effects 
of minimum wage rises are not conclusive, increases in the 
minimum wage tend to be identified with adverse, albeit modest, 
effects on employment. For example, Belman and Wolfson (2014)1, 
in compiling the findings of a broad range of studies, mostly 
relating to the United States labour market, have found adverse, 
but limited, effects on employment in about two thirds of them, 
with employment elasticity to the minimum wage of around-0.1% 
on average2.
In the case of Spain, the estimates made by Galán and Puente 
(2015)3 show that increases in the minimum wage between 2005 
and 20104 significantly raised the probability of employment loss, 
although the impact on aggregate employment was limited, given 
the low percentage of workers affected by the national minimum 
wage in Spain5. In this study, which uses the microdata contained 
in the Social Security administrative labour records (Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales, hereinafter MCVL), the group of 
workers affected by increases in the national minimum wage is 
defined as those whose wages in a given year are lower than the 
following year’s national minimum wage. For this group of workers, 
employers must decide whether to adjust the wage to the new 
mandatory minimum or else terminate the employment relationship. 
To analyse the effects on employment for this group of workers, a 
model has been estimated on the probability of employment loss 
in the 12 months following a rise in the national minimum wage. In 
addition to different control variables, this model includes a 
measure of the existing gap between a worker’s current wage and 
the new minimum wage. The coefficient of this variable can be 
interpreted as the effect of the minimum wage rise on the 
probability of employment loss6. As a result, the probability of 
employment loss following a rise in the minimum wage rose 
significantly for younger workers (aged 16 to 24), middle-aged 
workers (aged 33 to 45), and particularly for older workers (aged 
45 or over). Thus, the average probability of affected workers 
losing their employment within a year rose from 11.2% to 24.9% 
in the 16-24 age band as a result of cumulative increases in the 
BOX 5 THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT RISE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
1  D. Belman and P. Wolfson (2014). What Does the Minimum Wage Do?, 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI.
2  D. Neumark, J. M. Ian Salas, and W. Wascher (2014). In “Revisiting the 
Minimum Wage-Employment Debate: Throwing Out the Baby with the 
Bathwater?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 67 (Supplement), 
pp. 608-648, they stress that for certain groups of workers, such as 
younger, less qualified workers, these elasticities would be at least 
-0.2%.
3  “Minimum Wages: Do They Really Hurt Young People?”, B. E. Journal of 
Economic Analysis and Policy, 15(1), pp 299-328.
SOURCES: Ministry of Employment and Social Security and Banco de España.
a Prepared with data from the 2015 Social Security administrative labour records (MCVL) (full-time workers who have worked the full month). National minimum 
wage on a pro-rata basis (12 annual payments).
16-25 15.72 4.87 0.76 20.46 10.93 2.24 32.57 17.52 5.71
25-33 5.57 1.58 0.09 8.53 3.21 0.27 18.01 4.70 0.85
33-46 1.47 2.23 0.03 3.43 4.69 0.16 10.00 7.24 0.72
46-70 1.27 6.36 0.08 2.87 13.66 0.39 7.97 20.65 1.65
16-70 3.09 3.46 0.11 5.30 7.48 0.40 12.26 11.32 1.39
Scenario 3: Minimum wage = €950
Workers affected 
(%)
Of whom, lose 
their employment 
(%)




Of whom, lose 
their employment 
(%)




Of whom, lose 
their employment 
(%)
Effect on total 
employment (%)
Age
Scenario 1: Minimum wage = €707.6 Scenario 2: Minimum wage = €800
Table 1
EFFECT ON EMPLOYMENT (a) 
4  There was a cumulative increase of 37.5% (18.7% in real terms) in the 
minimum wage. 
5  Specifically, the wage rises implemented between 2005 and 2010 
affected only 0.6% to 0.9% of all workers per year. These figures are 
higher among certain groups, such as younger workers (between 1.1% 
and 2.2%).
6  Account should be taken of the fact that this effect underestimates the 
possible effect on total job destruction, since it centres only on job 
losses, not on the creation of new jobs. This bias will be greater insofar 
as workers’ productivity gains are higher owing to the experience they 
have gained, sufficient to offset increases in the national minimum wage. 
This offsetting effect is not available for workers seeking employment 
and, thus, for this group, the effects on job creation will be greater than 
on job destruction. Therefore, it is expected that the effect on 
employment for younger workers, who have the greatest experiential 
learning opportunities, will be underestimated.
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minimum wage during the period analysed (2005-2010)7, while the 
corresponding impact on workers aged 45 or over was much 
greater, with the probability rising from 11.2% to 49.9%8.
This analysis can be used as the basis for estimating the potential 
effect of the aforementioned newly approved rise in the minimum 
wage9. To this end, a microsimulation exercise has been performed 
using the estimated probabilities, where each worker affected by 
the new minimum wage is assigned to one of the following two 
groups: workers who keep their employment and whose wages 
increase to match the new mandatory minimum amount, or 
workers who lose their employment. This exercise has been 
carried out for the minimum wage already approved in 2017 and 
also for the two proposals mentioned earlier, which involve raising 
the national minimum wage to €800 and €950.
Table 1 shows the results of this simulation for the three minimum 
wage increases considered. In terms of currently affected workers, 
the rise approved in 2017 gives a percentage of 3.1%, above the 
figures estimated for the 2005-2010 period (around 0.75% per 
year). By age group, the differences are considerable, since 15.7% 
of younger workers would be affected by the minimum wage rise, 
compared with a much lower figure of around 1%, among older 
workers. Naturally, these figures are higher for the scenarios of 
additional increases in the national minimum wage until 2020. 
These results show that, in the event of an increase of up to €950 
per month, the percentage of affected workers would reach 
12.3%, with almost a third being younger workers.
As regards the loss of employment resulting from these increases, 
a relatively limited potential impact is estimated for the economy 
as a whole. Specifically, the aggregate effect on employment 
would be a fall of 0.1% in the case of the minimum wage increase 
approved in 2017, and of 1.4% for the proposed rise to be 
achieved by 202010. For workers affected by the increase, the 
potential loss of employment could reach 3.5% in the case of that 
approved in 2017, and 7.5% and 11.3% in the case of the 
proposed increases of €800 and €950, respectively. By groups of 
workers, the probability of employment loss for workers affected 
by the national minimum wage is higher among younger workers 
and higher still among older workers. 
This exercise allows for the estimation of the impact of the increase 
in the minimum wage on total labour income and its distribution. As 
can be observed in Chart 1.1, in aggregate terms, the minimum 
wage rise has a limited impact on aggregate wage income, since the 
positive effects on workers who remain employed tend to be offset 
by the loss in wage income of those who lose their jobs. However, 
the changes are more significant as regards the distribution of wage 
income across different population groups. In particular, there are 
substantial differences by age band, with higher average income 
among younger workers, for whom the wage rise more than offsets 
employment losses. In contrast, for the group of workers aged 45 or 
BOX 5 THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT RISE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Ministry of Employment and Social Security and Banco de España.
a Prepared with data from the 2015 Social Security administrative labour records (MCVL) (full-time workers who have worked the full month). National minimum 
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2  EFFECT ON INEQUALITY (CHANGE IN GINI INDEX)
Chart 1  
EFFECT ON TOTAL EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INEQUALITY (a)
 16-25 YEARS  25-33 YEARS  33-46 YEARS  46-70 YEARS  16-70 YEARS
7  This probability is the result of simulating the cumulative increase in the 
minimum wage between 2005 to 2010 on the wage distribution observed 
in 2004.
8  Overall, the results would imply an elasticity of employment to minimum 
wage of around -0.2% for younger workers, in line with studies 
conducted on other countries, albeit very limited for aggregate 
employment, given given the low percentage of workers affected by the 
national minimum wage in Spain. However, it should be noted that the 
effects of the minimum wage on employment are not linear, since the 
number of affected workers for each additional euro is greater the higher 
the previous minimum wage level. Special caution is therefore needed 
when extrapolating elasticities to future rises in the national minimum 
wage, since they will generally be greater than previously estimated.
9  Specifically, for each affected worker in 2015 (the latest available year of 
the MCVL), the probability of employment loss is calculated on the basis 
of the worker’s age and the difference between his/her current salary 
and the new national minimum wage considered. For part-time workers 
or those who have not worked a full month, the new minimum is adjusted 
to the corresponding proportion of time worked. 10  This non-linear effect arises for the reasons set out in footnote 8.
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over, employment losses are so high that labour income declines. 
With respect to the impact on wage inequality, Chart 1.2 shows the 
effects of the three scenarios using the estimated variation of the 
Gini index11. The analysis shows that the aggregate inequality relative 
to wage income distribution hardly varies although the changes in 
inequality by age group are significant, with higher inequality among 
both younger and older workers, particularly in the scenarios of 
additional increases in the national minimum wage.
Overall, the results presented in this box suggest a low aggregate 
impact on employment of the recent rise in the national minimum 
wage, given that the group of workers potentially affected by the 
increases in the national minimum wage is small. However, its 
impact on the probability of employment loss among certain 
groups, such as younger and older workers, is significant. It should 
be stressed that the effects of these increases are relatively limited 
since the minimum wages which are binding for most jobs in Spain 
are those agreed on in collective bargaining processes, and are 
currently higher than the mandatory minimum wage. These effects 
could be greater if the increases in the national minimum wage 
were to be applied to broader groups of workers, for example, if 
they were used as the basis for collective bargaining.
BOX 5 THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT RISE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES (cont’d)
11  The Gini index is a measure of the degree of inequality across the entire 
income distribution. The more inequality, the higher the index. A totally even 
distribution would give an index of 0 while a totally unequal distribution, 
with all income concentrated in one individual, would give an index of 1.
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Traditionally in Spain, households’ acquisitions of housing have 
predominantly been financed with variable interest rate loans. This 
means that the cost of funds changes periodically throughout the 
life of the loan, on the basis of the benchmark used (generally the 
12-month Euribor). The attractiveness for banks of this option is 
that it ties the changes in the revenue obtained on loans granted 
to those in its funding costs, since the latter are habitually renewed 
with great frequency, in line with interbank market yields, given the 
prevalence of short-term operations. By being able to mitigate 
interest-rate risk, banks can offer very-long-dated maturities, with 
the subsequent reduction in the repayment instalments borne by 
borrowers. In fixed-rate lending operations, this risk can be 
covered in the swaps markets, but the horizon over which these 
contracts were available until very recently did not extend beyond 
10 or 15 years. One advantage that is occasionally indicated as 
being favourable to borrowers under the variable-rate arrangement 
is that, under normal conditions, the expected average cost over 
the life of the loan is lower (see Chart 1), as no risk premium by 
term2 is included. However, the fact that the cost of financing of 
variable-rate loans fluctuates throughout the life of the operation 
adds uncertainty as to its future course.
Within the euro area, Spain is among the group of countries in 
which the significance of variable-rate financing (in particular, with 
initial reset periods of less than one year) is greatest, along with 
Portugal, Italy and Ireland. This is unlike other European economies 
such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, where these 
operations are a minority option. Nonetheless, since early 2010, 
the weight of new loans in which the cost is reset before one year 
has elapsed (see Chart 2) has progressively diminished in Spain. In 
an initial phase, to mid-2015, there was an increase in the 
proportion of loans with initial rate fixation periods of between one 
and five years. Subsequently, the over-five-years segment – in 
which fixed-rate contracts are included – began to grow.3 As a 
result, the segment with initial reset of up to one year has declined 
from accounting for 80-90% in 2010 to scarcely 50% at present. 
This tendency towards the lengthening of interest rate reset terms 
has also been observed in other euro area countries, with greater 
intensity in those economies in which operations up to one year 
were predominant, such as Italy and Portugal, although this has 
also been the case, albeit to a lesser extent, in other countries 
where initial rate fixation periods of over five years were more 
prevalent (see Chart 3). 
The change observed in the structure of reset terms for new 
housing loans in Spain and in the other euro area countries has 
been accompanied, in the recent period, by a reduction in the 
spread between the interest rate applied to loans with an initial 
rate fixation of over five years and the initial cost where terms are 
reset in less than one year, which may have boosted borrowers’ 
demand for the first interest-rate type (see Charts 4 and 5). This 
development has been assisted by both the flattening of debt 
market yield curves, which has enabled banks to offer comparatively 
more attractive terms in fixed-rate operations, and the improvements 
in the infrastructure of derivatives markets, including most notably 
the growing use of clearing houses, which allow banks to hedge 
against longer-dated interest rate risk. 
These changes in the structure of the mortgage market have some 
substantial consequences. The increase in the weight of transactions 
whose terms are reset at over five years, with higher interest rates 
than in those where reset is at less than one year, tends to translate 
into a rise in the synthetic cost of borrowing (which is calculated 
weighting the volume of new loans by their initial interest rates), 
irrespective of movements in yields in each segment. This 
development can be clearly discerned in Chart 6, which compares 
the observed value of this indicator with that which would have 
prevailed in the event of the term structure as at December 2010 
having been maintained. It can be seen how, in the most recent 
period, this composition effect has meant that the synthetic indicator 
underestimates the improvement in financing conditions. 
In the longer term, the most significant consequence of the change 
in the structure of the mortgage markets is that household 
financing costs will become less sensitive to interest rate 
movements, thereby limiting the scope of the effects associated 
with monetary policy decisions (in particular those that operate 
through the income effect of interest-rate changes). However, 
given the long-dated maturities of outstanding debt and how 
recent the changes in the composition of new lending business 
are, the impact on the overall credit portfolio is still very limited. 
Thus, in December 2016, 96.6% of the outstanding balance of 
loans for house purchase in Spain was at a variable rate, and 
85.2% used the 12-month Euribor as a benchmark. 
BOX 6 RECENT CHANGES IN INTEREST-RATE RESET TERMS FOR NEW HOUSING LOANS1
1  New loans include contracts formalised for the first time; renegotiated 
loans, provided that the borrower plays an active part; restructured 
loans, if they are at market interest rates; and those in which there has 
been a subrogation of the debtor. 
2  The risk premium by term is the price paid for not incurring interest rate 
risk.
3  This tendency is observed not only in loans formalised for the first time 
but also in renegotiated loans
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BOX 6
 
RECENT CHANGES IN INTEREST-RATE RESET TERMS FOR NEW HOUSING LOANS (cont’d)
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a The values depicted in the charts are a rolling average of the figures for the past twelve months of the year ending in each quarter; for loans, simple averages; 
and for interest rates, weighted averages (by lending volume). These data correspond to new loans approved in the month.
b Average cost with rate reset periods existing in each period.
c Average cost with rate reset periods as at December 2010.
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NOTE: This box was published on the Banco de España website on 29 March 2017.
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Non-resident tourism in Spain was notably buoyant in 2016. 
Specifically, foreign tourist arrivals were 10.3% up on the already-
high level recorded in 2015, reaching an all-time peak of 75.6 
million visitors, which also led to a significant 9% increase in total 
foreign tourist expenditure, taking it to €77.6 billion, the highest 
figure in the time series. Also, the increase in tourist arrivals in 
Spain outpaced the much more moderate growth rate of the 
volume of world tourism, by 6 pp.  
This positive performance of non-resident tourism, accompanied 
by a fresh increase in domestic tourism demand (albeit more 
moderate than in 2015) enabled tourism GDP to increase by 
almost 5%, in accordance with the Exceltur indicator, meaning 
that it exceeded GDP growth for the economy as a whole, as has 
been the case since 2010 (see Chart 1).1 The strength of tourism 
would largely explain the better relative economic performance in 
2016 of the regions where the weight of tourism is greater.2
The performance of non-resident tourism had already been 
favourable in 2015, boosted by the improvement of its main 
determinants, such as the recovery in the developed economies 
(accounting for approximately 90% of our markets), the notable 
depreciation of the euro (specifically, the nominal effective 
exchange rate – NEER – against the group of non-euro developed 
countries was 9.3% weaker in 2015 as a whole), and the decline in 
oil prices, which lowered transport costs. In 2016 some of these 
transitory factors tended to lose momentum: developed economies 
slowed moderately (see Chart 2), while the NEER tended to 
appreciate and oil prices to increase, although these two variables 
remained at levels clearly lower than those seen in 2014 (see 
Chart  3). Additionally, against a backdrop of insecurity in some 
competing regions, Spain’s appeal as a safe-haven tourist 
destination has been a determining element, particularly in 2016. 
Beyond these less persistent factors, improvements in Spain’s 
economic competitiveness built up in recent years through the 
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Chart 1
ACTIVITY IN THE TOURISM SECTOR
1  Exceltur’s Synthetic Indicator of Tourism GDP (ISTE) is constructed as a 
linear combination of a set of variables related to tourism demand, both 
domestic (private consumption and resident overnight hotel stays) and 
foreign (foreign tourist arrivals, revenues from tourism and travel of the 
Balance of Payments and GDP of the main tourist origination markets). 
This indicator allows an approximation to the real growth of internal 
tourism in Spain. 
2  The Balearic and Canary Islands and the Valencia region were, according 
to AIReF estimates, the regions which grew the most in 2016. 
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moderation of labour and financial costs have likewise favoured 
our country’s tourism potential.
Using a simple econometric model which approximates the 
performance of QNA real tourist revenues based on several 
explanatory factors,3 changes in the income of tourist countries of 
origin (GDP), price-competitiveness and exchange rates (PREL by 
its Spanish abbreviation) and oil prices (PRPETR) would account 
for around two-thirds of the growth of tourism in the two-year 
period 2015-2016 and the remaining third would relate to other 
factors not explicitly included in the model (see Chart 4).
In an attempt to identify these additional factors, it is useful to 
consider the performance of the so-called tourism competitiveness 
index prepared by the World Economic Forum, which summarises 
the performance of different variables explaining a country’s ability 
to compete in world tourism markets (see Chart 5). Spain led the 
ranking based on this indicator for the first time in 2015. In 
comparison with 2008, there were notable improvements in two 
specific areas which would have been strengthened by Spain’s 
traditional lure as a tourist destination, based on its weather, 
natural resources or infrastructure.
Firstly, as noted above, progress was significant in security, against 
a background of high conflict in certain competing geographical 
areas. Specifically, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011, 
insecurity swept across the main competitor destinations in North 
Africa (such as Tunisia and Egypt) and in 2016 extended into 
Turkey, the sixth most popular tourist destination until then and 
which would have lost around 30% of its foreign visitors last year 
(see Chart 6). Secondly, the sector has notably and robustly 
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Chart 5
TOURISM COMPETITIVENESS INDEX. SPAIN:
MAIN CATEGORIES (c)
SOURCES: INE; Exceltur, Eurostat, UNWTO and World Economic Forum (WEF).
a Synthetic Indicator of Spanish Tourism GDP, prepared by Exceltur.
b An increase in the index represents a loss of competitiveness and vice-versa.
c In brackets, Spain's position in the ranking by category.
3  Specifically, a single-phase error correction mechanism is estimated for 
the logarithm of QNA real exports of tourist services, with quarterly data 
for the period 2000-2015. Tourism demand is approximated using an 
indicator of the real GDP in the main markets from which tourists visiting 
Spain originate. The competitiveness variable measures changes in 
relative prices in Spain (CPI) compared with customer and competitor 
countries. The cost of travelling to a destination is approximated by the 
price of oil relative to the cost of living in tourists’ countries of origin.
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adapted to the new digital consumption habits. Additionally, in 
terms of revenue, the favourable performance of tourism in 2016 is 
related to the profile of tourists arriving in Spain, more of whom 
chose to stay in more expensive accommodation. Specifically, 
hotels, which are associated with a higher average daily outlay, 
gained weight in the total, while the average length of stay in this 
type of accommodation stabilised, interrupting the declining trend 
of these two variables in recent years (see Chart 7). Also, in 2016 
there was an increase in the weight of holiday packages, usually 
involving overnight stays in hotels, which are more expensive than 
apartment rentals, the latter being more popular among independent 
travellers, whose share in the total has decreased. The counterpoint 
to this is the distribution by country of origin, with a notable 
recovery of German tourists, whose average destination 
expenditure is high, whereas the French market slowed slightly, 
and the daily average expenditure of French visitors is usually 
lower. Finally, the British market accelerated notably (from 5.1% in 
2015 to 12.4%) while the average expenditure per tourist increased 
somewhat, despite the heavy depreciation of the pound against the 
euro following the outcome of the British referendum on its 
permanence in the European Union.4
The momentum of tourism exports in 2016 led to an increase in 
the share in GDP (in nominal terms) to above 4% (a figure not seen 
since 2001). However, the notable rise in tourism imports, to 1.5% 
of nominal GDP, prevented the tourism surplus from improving, 
and it stabilised at around 2.7% of GDP (see Chart 8). Looking 
ahead, traditional determinants as a whole can be expected to 
continue contributing to the growth of tourism in a manner similar 
to that seen in recent years. In the longer term, the challenge 
remains of raising the added value of services offered, which 
would especially help to enhance recent visitor loyalty.
BOX 7
 
DYNAMISM OF NON-RESIDENT TOURISM IN 2016 AND ITS DETERMINANTS (cont’d)
4  In part, these developments could be a result of the strong substitution 
effect among destinations which, in the case of British tourism flows, 
were seen from Turkey to Spain.
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2  EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In the last three months the international economic and financial setting has continued to 
be marked by heightened political uncertainty which, so far, has not been reflected in the 
financial indicators. Markets — both sovereign fixed-income and stock markets and 
higher-risk segments — continued to perform favourably, while long-term interest rates in 
the advanced economies stabilised and volatility diminished. Oil prices, which evidenced 
substantial stability until the first week of March, fell sharply thereafter and held at a level 
10% below that at the end of the preceding quarter. National Accounts figures for 2016 Q4 
show that GDP grew above expectations in the advanced economies, except in the United 
States. In the emerging economies, meanwhile, performance was clearly mixed, with 
vigorous growth in Asia, which was conducive to a moderate rise in international trade, 
and a further slowdown in Latin America. Lastly, inflation in the last three months increased 
both in the advanced economies — although the underlying rates and expectations 
scarcely changed — and in certain emerging economies, excluding Latin America where 
the declining trend continued. 
More specifically, financial markets performed favourably over the last three months. Stock 
markets rose (especially in the United States, where they posted historical highs, but also 
in the emerging economies, where on average they were 8% up in late March on the 
November 2016 level) and debt markets normalised somewhat, which helped squeeze 
higher-risk asset spreads, including those of the emerging economies (especially in Latin 
America). These developments were against a background of low volatility and some 
appetite for risk, which is in contrast to the heightened political uncertainty both in the 
United States — where there are doubts over the timing and scope of the new 
Administration’s measures — and in Europe, owing to Brexit and successive upcoming 
elections in 2017. 
With regard to exchange rates, the dollar began the year depreciating substantially against 
the currencies of the main developed economies and most of the emerging countries, in a 
setting in which interest rate spreads held stable. Mid-February then marked a turning 
point, with the US currency appreciating. The rise in US policy rates on 15 March, the third 
since December 2015, exerted upward pressure on long-term rates and further boosted 
the dollar. Notable on the emerging markets was the depreciation of the Turkish lira by 
more than 3%, faced with a deteriorating domestic and external political outlook, and, in 
the opposite direction, the appreciation of the Mexican peso, by close to 9% since the 
start of 2017, following its heavy depreciation in the wake of the US election result. In this 
latter case, the possibility of a less adverse scenario in respect of the trade restrictions 
imposed by the new US Administration, rises in the policy rate and the implementation of 
an exchange rate hedge programme to reduce volatility all appear to have played a 
significant role. The soundness of markets was also reflected in a pick-up in capital flows 
towards the emerging economies and in an increase in these economies’ bond placements, 
in a market dominated by commodities corporations and sovereign issuers. 
During the quarter commodities prices rose 1.1%, at the aggregate level, with divergences 
across the different components. Metals climbed by 4.7%, on account of the recovery in 
Chinese demand and the prospect of a US infrastructure plan, as well as certain supply 
constraints in Chile, and food prices fell by 1.3%. The per-barrel price of Brent oil held from 
end-2016 in a narrow range around $55 dollars, but following the release of higher-than-
2.1  External environment 
of the euro area
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expected US inventories data, on 8 March, there was an abrupt correction in the price of 
crude (and the related futures) to $51 dollars per barrel, the level around which it has since 
fluctuated. 
Economic activity in the non-euro area advanced economies provided a favourable 
surprise once again in 2016 Q4. In the United Kingdom, GDP growth in Q4 was 0.7% 
quarter-on-quarter, 0.1 pp up on Q3; and in Japan, the annualised quarter-on-quarter rate 
stood at 1.2%, slightly down on the figure for Q3. In both cases, the unexpected strength 
of the external sector offset some weakening in domestic demand, especially in private 
consumption. The exception was the United States, where GDP grew at an annualised 
quarter-on-quarter rate of 1.9% (3.5% in the previous quarter), chiefly owing to the 
weakness of the external sector, since both consumption and private investment remained 
notably buoyant. The inflation rate in these economies rose throughout the quarter (to 
2.7% in the United States and 2.3% in the United Kingdom in February, and to 0.4 % in 
Japan in January), although both core inflation rates and inflation expectations held on a 
more stable path. Against this background, neither the Bank of Japan nor the Bank of 
England made changes to their monetary policies. Conversely, as indicated, the Federal 
Reserve raised the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 bp (to 0.75%-1%) in mid-
March, the third increase in the current cycle of normalisation initiated in December 2015, 
SOURCE: Datastream and Banco de España.
a An increase in the index represents an appreciation of the currency.
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and a development widely anticipated by the markets since late February. Moreover, from 
a short-term perspective, there has been an alignment between the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) members’ projections and those of the financial markets as regards 
policy rate movements, with two further rises expected over the rest of this year. 
Activity in the emerging economies in late 2016 was more mixed. In China, government 
support measures once more propped up GDP growth, which posted a year-on-year rate 
of 6.8% in Q4. Meanwhile, in the rest of emerging Asia there was a notable slowdown in 
activity in India (7% year-on-year, 0.3 pp down on the previous quarter), which was 
however less than expected following the government’s demonetisation decree. In the 
new EU Member States not belonging to the euro area, GDP growth increased in Q4 as a 
result of the greater buoyancy of consumption and, in Poland and Romania, of the 
expansionary fiscal measures. In Latin America, data for Q4 were positive in Colombia and 
Mexico, and worse than anticipated in Chile and, especially, Brazil, which ended 2016 with 
a 3.6% decline in activity, similar to that of the previous year. Inflation generally moved on 
a rising trend in the emerging regions of Europe and Asia, but continued to fall in the five 
main Latin American countries with inflation targets (more markedly so in Brazil, thanks to 
regulated prices), with the exception of Mexico, owing to the depreciation of the peso and 
the rise in petrol prices. Turning to monetary policy, the main changes were concentrated 
in Latin America, where the central banks of Brazil, Colombia and Chile cut policy rates 
while the Mexican central bank raised theirs. In other regions there was a notable rise in 
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
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policy rates in Turkey, faced with the increase in inflation pressure on its currency, and in 
China, where the small increases in its new lending facilities are in response to the 
authorities’ aim to preserve financial stability. 
In the euro area the latest economic developments suggest a progressive firming of the 
recovery, which is expected to spread to all the countries in the area, albeit with differing 
intensity. The signals emitted by the short-term indicators, which have stood at highs for 
almost five years, have also been positive. This indicates that activity might have quickened 
in the opening months of 2017, despite the presence of several geopolitical factors casting 
a shadow of uncertainty over the global economy and the EU itself. However, this 
acceleration is not expected to extend to the coming quarters. The latest forecasts 
available, including the ECB’s macroeconomic projections exercise in March, do not point 
2.2  The euro area and 
the monetary policy 
of the European 
Central Bank 
SOURCES: Datastream, Banco de España, IMF and JP Morgan.
a The aggregate of the different areas has been calculated using the weight of the countries that make up these areas in the world economy, drawing on World 
Bank information.
b Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines and Taiwan.
d Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and, from July 2013, Croatia.
e JP Morgan EMBI spreads. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Asia includes China, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The data on the new EU Member States relate to Hungary, Poland and Romania and, 
from July 2013, Croatia.
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to significant changes in the economic outlook for the area, whereby the current moderate 
growth path will continue over the 2017-2019 horizon. 
Inflation rose to 2 % in February, driven by the increase in oil prices and, above all, the 
automatic effect arising from the comparison with the low energy prices recorded in early 
2016 (the so-called base effects1). By contrast, core inflation held stable at levels still 
some way off the 2% reference, and no pressures in price and wage formation are 
apparently discernible (see Box 3). In this respect, the ECB March projections exercise 
added very few changes, beyond 2017, to the medium-term inflationary outlook that the 
Governing Council had analysed last December, when far-reaching monetary policy 
decisions were taken. 
In this setting of moderate growth and rising inflation, which is considered temporary, the 
ECB Governing Council decided to hold its benchmark interest rates unchanged, confirming 
that rates are expected to hold at current or lower levels over a prolonged period that runs 
beyond the horizon for the asset purchase programme. The Council also reiterated its 
commitment to continue with net asset purchases at a monthly pace of €60 billion to 
December 2017 or beyond, and even to increase them were it necessary, until it should 
see a sustained adjustment in the inflation path consistent with its medium-term objective. 
Further, the Council stressed the need, in the current circumstances, for economic policies 
to contribute more resolutely to strengthening economic growth. 
On National Accounts figures, euro area GDP grew by 0.4% in 2016 Q4 (see Table 2), 
placing growth for the year as a whole at 1.7%, a similar rate to that observed the 
previous year. In terms of components, the increase in output in the final stretch of the 
year was once again underpinned by consumption, private and government alike. 
Additionally, gross fixed capital formation rose, driven by all its components. The 
contribution of net exports was negative, since the increase in exports was offset by an 
even bigger increase in imports. Country by country, the growth in economic activity 
was, while generalised, uneven. Thus, while activity quickened in Germany and France 
to 0.4%, underpinned above all by domestic demand, in Italy it continued to grow at a 
very moderate rate (0.2%), due above all to the sluggishness of Italian private 
consumption and net external demand. 
Although the information available is as yet partial, the qualitative indicators released point 
to a possible quickening in economic activity in the euro area at the start of 2017. On the 
supply side, the European Commission’s (EC) business confidence indicators, together 
with the survey-based opinions of purchasing managers in the PMI indicator, evidenced a 
continuation in Q1 of the rise dating back to autumn 2016 in both industry and in services. 
Both these indicators are at six-year highs. Along these same lines, job-creation 
expectations reflected in the EC surveys continued to be favourable in industry and 
construction. On the demand side, consumer confidence improved in the first two months 
of the year as a whole, although the lagged quantitative indicators revealed something of 
a slowdown. Accordingly, retail sales fell back once again in January and new car 
registrations grew at a more moderate pace, while the unemployment rate held in January 
at 9.6%. In the case of investment, the degree of capacity utilisation edged up slightly in 
this quarter, and the assessment of firms’ order books — both those intended for the 
domestic market and for export — improved. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
1  See Box 3, Quarterly report on the Spanish economy, December 2016. 
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In the medium term, the outlook is for the continuity of the relatively modest pace of 
recovery in the area, which will be underpinned by the sound performance of private 
consumption (boosted by favourable financing conditions) and of exports (driven by the 
improvement in world trade and the depreciation of the euro). Foreseeably, however, 
the impact of higher fuel prices on real disposable income will somewhat diminish the 
momentum of the first of these aggregate demand components. This scenario is 
reflected in the latest Eurosystem projections exercise, which revised the growth 
forecasts for 2017 and 2018 marginally upwards by 0.1 pp to 1.8% and 1.7%, 
respectively, leaving the rate projected for 2019 unchanged at 1.6% (see Table 3). The 
growth outlook for the area remained subject, albeit with less intensity than some 
months back, to downside risks associated with the uncertainty stemming from US 
economic policies, the Brexit negotiations, the forthcoming elections this year in some 
of the core euro area countries and the fragility of certain banks. 
As regards prices, inflation stood at 2% in February, after accelerating strongly for three 
months. This increase has been boosted by the growth of energy and unprocessed food 
prices. By contrast, core inflation has held stable at 0.9%. There are no signs either that 
the increase in inflation is feeding through to price and wage formation processes in a 
setting in which demand pressures are limited (see Box 3). In this respect, the latest ECB 
forecasts revise the inflation figures for 2017 substantially upwards to 1.7%, but they hold 
the forecasts for 2018 and 2019 relatively stable at 1.6% and 1.7%, respectively. 
On 22 February this year the EC published its In-Depth Reviews (IDRs) of the 13 Member 
States which, according to the Alert Mechanism results, could evidence macroeconomic 
imbalances. In line with the findings of these reviews, the Commission maintained its 
assessment for the prior year, except in the case of Finland, for which it concluded that 
the country presents no imbalances for the purposes of the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure (MIP). Thus, certain countries (Germany, Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia and Sweden) have economic imbalances, which the EC qualifies as excessive 
in the cases of Bulgaria, France, Croatia, Italy, Portugal and Cyprus. Broadly, the EC 
reports warn about the adverse consequences for the internal adjustment of the euro 
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a Information available up to 21 March 2017.
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SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics and Banco de España.
a Scale of axis is limited so as not to distort the chart with the Q3 figure for Ireland, which is 4.0%.
b Q3 figure not available.
c Year-on-year rates, based on the non-centred quarterly moving average of the seasonally adjusted series.
d Normalised series for the period represented.
e Bank Lending Survey. Indicator = percentage of banks reporting a considerable increase + percentage of banks reporting some increase × 0.5 – percentage 
of banks reporting some decrease × 0.5 – percentage of banks reporting a considerable decrease. A positive value denotes an increase.
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area that arise from the persistence of high current account surpluses in some countries 
and from the large volumes of non-performing loans that continue to weigh on the 
financial sector in some Member States. 
On this occasion, moreover, the EC conducted an analysis of the implementation status of 
recommendations since it began to apply this procedure. The analysis reveals a highly 
uneven degree of ambition across the member countries in the application of these 
recommendations. Broadly, most progress is observed in the financial sector, in labour 
markets and in the consolidation of public finances. Conversely, progress in the business 
environment and in the creation of a framework conducive to investment is more limited 
and uneven across the different countries. The area where reform has least progressed is 
the services sector. 
In the fiscal domain, the EC published a report on Italy in which it analysed its degree of 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) debt criterion, warning on the need to 
implement further measures to enable the commitments undertaken to be met. A proposal to 
fine Austria for proven irregularities in the public debt data sent to Eurostat in 2012 and 2013 
was also submitted to the Council. Lastly, the EC gave a favourable assessment of the degree 
of transposition of the Fiscal Compact (which essentially introduces the obligation to 
incorporate the rule imposing a balanced budget throughout the cycle and an independent 
fiscal council into national fiscal frameworks), although it highlighted shortcomings affecting 
the independent fiscal councils of Spain, Greece and Slovenia. 
To commemorate the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties establishing the 
European Union, the EC published a White Paper on the future of Europe on 1 March. Its 
aim here was to initiate a debate on the strategy to move towards greater integration of the 
European Union countries. During this semester, the Commission will publish five additional 
policy papers on the development of Europe’s social dimension, the deepening of 
Economic and Monetary Union, harnessing globalisation, the future of European defence 
and the future of European Union finances.
Despite the increase in political uncertainty witnessed since mid-2016, the performance of 
euro area financial markets remained relatively favourable. The rise on stock markets 
initiated in autumn last year continued and the favourable financing conditions prevailing 
both for households and firms held stable. The increase in uncertainty only affected 
sovereign debt spreads over Germany, undergoing a sustained rise throughout 2017 Q1 
which was partly corrected in late March. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS  
AND MONETARY POLICY 
81027102
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The ECB Governing Council on 9 March held reference interest rates unchanged at 0%, 
for the main refinancing operations, and at 0.25 % and -0.40 %, respectively, for the 
marginal lending facility and the deposit facility. It reiterated its expectation for rates to 
remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, well past the horizon 
of its net purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP). With regard to the 
APP, the Council insisted on its commitment to make purchases at the current monthly 
pace of €80 billion until the end of March, continuing thereafter at a monthly pace of 
€60 billion until December 2017 or, where necessary, beyond, until the Council sees a 
sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its medium-term objective. 
To ensure a smooth implementation of the sovereign bond purchase programme, the 
Council resolved at its first meeting of the year to amend some of its technical parameters, 
shortening the minimum residual maturity of eligible one-year bonds and authorising, 
insofar as this may prove necessary, purchases of debt with a yield lower than the 
deposit facility rate. 
The authorisation of purchases below the deposit facility rate was immediately reflected 
in the short-term yield on German debt, meaning that two-year bonds came to stand at 
SOURCES: Eurostat and ECB.
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an all-time low of -0.9 %. The yield spread of US 10-year government bonds over the 
German Bund corrected in recent days the rise recorded mid-quarter, standing at 
around 215 bp as at the cut-off date for this Report, slightly below the levels reached in 
early January. Sovereign spreads within the euro area tended to widen, particularly in 
the cases of Italy, France, Belgium and Portugal, albeit with a degree of volatility in this 
latter instance. 
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Estimated by the European Central Bank using swap market data.
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Stock markets continued on the rising trend recorded late last year. The Eurostoxx  50 
posted a rise of 4% during the quarter, against a background of low volatility. 
On the currency markets, the exchange rate of the euro held relatively constant against the 
main currencies. In Q1, it traded at around £0.86 per euro and $1.06 per euro, although it 
appreciated slightly against the dollar in the closing days of March. This relative stability 
was also extensive to the nominal effective exchange rate, which depreciated marginally 
by 0.1% during the quarter. 
Loans to the private sector held on a gradually recovering path. In the case of loans 
granted to households, the pace of expansion quickened in January to 2.2% year-on-year, 
while the growth of loans to non-financial corporations held stable at 2.3%. As regards the 
monetary aggregates, the year-on-year rate of M3 continued to show the stable growth 
characterising it over the past 18 months, standing in January at 4.9%. M1, after seeing its 
decelerating path initiated in late 2015 interrupted in November, posted year-on-year 
growth of 8.4% that month.
SOURCE: ECB.
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3 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In 2016 Q4 Spanish GDP grew by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter, the same rate as in Q3 (see 
Chart 9). GDP growth in Q4 was primarily based on domestic demand, which made a 
somewhat higher positive contribution than in the preceding quarter, of 0.6 percentage 
points (pp). The greater buoyancy of this aggregate stemmed from the acceleration in 
investment (apart from the capital goods component) and from continuation of the 
favourable behaviour of private consumption, which offset the slight decline in 
government consumption, in contrast to its growth in Q3. Meanwhile, the positive 
contribution of external demand was down from the previous quarter (to 0.1 pp), against 
the background of a slightly stronger recovery in imports than in exports, following the 
decline in both flows in Q3. In year-on-year terms GDP grew by 3%, down 0.2 pp from 
the previous quarter, while employment growth moderated by 0.2 pp, to 2.7%. During 
2016 as a whole GDP grew by 3.2%, the same rate as in 2015, while employment slowed 
a little, by 0.1 pp, to 2.9%.
According to the latest data, the rate of growth of GDP in Q1 was somewhat higher than 
the 0.7% rate observed in the previous quarter and continued to be underpinned by 
domestic demand. The indicators available for the external sector in Q1, albeit still very 
incomplete, point to a slightly positive contribution from external demand. Finally, 
employment is estimated to have grown at a high rate in Q1, after weakening somewhat 
towards the end of 2016.
The increase in consumer prices in Q1 was marked by a sharp acceleration in December 
and January, following the moderate growth rate that dated back to last May. In February, 
the annual rate of change in consumer prices stabilised at the high level of 3%. This 
behaviour stemmed from the recent acceleration in energy prices and the base effects 
associated with the fall in such prices a year ago. The changes in the other components 
were more moderate, with an acceleration in the case of food prices and a slight slowdown in 
services prices. As a result, the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy rose in February 
at a similar annual rate to December, of 1%, while the CPI accelerated by 1.4 pp, to 3%.
In 2017 to date, the financing costs of resident agents in the case of long-term bond 
issuance continued to rise. In particular, the interest rate on Spanish ten-year sovereign 
debt increased from 1.4% at the end of 2016 to 1.7% as at the date of this report going to 
press. As the yield on the German bond with the same maturity increased to a lesser 
extent during this period, the spread between these two yields widened by 15  bp, to 
130 bp (see Chart 10). The rise in the cost of bond issuance for corporations was mitigated 
by the behaviour of their credit risk premiums, which have fallen since the end of 2016, 
both in the case of financial and non-financial corporations. At the same time, there was 
barely any change in interbank market rates, so that twelve-month EURIBOR remained in 
negative territory (-0.11%). In equity markets, the IBEX 35 rose by 10.2%, outperforming 
the Eurostoxx 50, which increased by 4.7%.
The average cost of bank credit for the non-financial private sector did not change 
significantly during the final part of 2016 or in January (the latest period for which data are 
available), remaining at low levels. Against this background, following moderate growth in 
activity on credit markets in 2016 Q4 (with the exception of the segment of loans to 
corporations of more than €1 million, in which volume continued to fall, affected by the 
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greater attraction of securities issuance), in January there was a general upturn in the 
volumes of new credit. This behaviour in terms of volumes allowed the fall in the outstanding 
amount of bank lending to households and corporations to moderate slightly between 
September and January. In the case of larger companies the financing through bond 
issuance accelerated, so that the aggregate financing from these two sources grew at a 
small positive year-on-year rate in January. Finally, during the latter months of 2016, the 
financial position of households and non-financial corporations continued to strengthen, as 
a result of the increase in their wealth and the reduction in their debts.
According to the latest information received, household consumption continued to grow at 
a high rate in Q1, albeit somewhat below the 0.7% rate in the preceding quarter, against a 
background of continued strong employment generation and accommodating financial 
conditions. Thus, the qualitative indicators continued to show favourable behaviour on 
average in January and February in most cases, especially the consumer goods PMI and 
the services confidence index. However, consumer and retailer confidence indicators 
deteriorated in February. In the case of retailers, the average level over the period January-
February was even lower than that of the final quarter of 2016. The latest quantitative 
information has been mixed. In terms of the three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate 
to February private vehicle registrations continued to grow at a high rate, while the growth 
in social security registrations moderated slightly. On less up-to-date data, for the period 
to January, retail trade and consumer-good industrial production indices slowed somewhat, 
while consumer goods imports remained buoyant (see Chart 11).
In the case of residential investment, the available indicators point to a slight moderation 
in the growth of this component of household demand in Q1, following an acceleration in 
the previous quarter, against a background of gradual recovery in new construction 
permits. On the demand side, housing transactions according to notarial statistics 
amounted to more than 38,000 transactions, in terms of monthly averages, during 2016 as 
a whole, resulting in an increase of around 14% on 2015. The increase in house sales, 
which continued to be concentrated in the second-hand segment, stemmed from both 
purchases by foreigners (around 17% of the total) and from acquisitions by Spanish 
3.1  Household spending 
decisions
FUENTES: Bloomberg,






2014 2015 2016 2017
 DOMESTIC DEMAND  EXTERNAL DEMAND
 GDP. YEAR-ON-YEAR RATE
%






2014 2015 2016 2017
 EXTERNAL DEMAND  GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
 PRIVATE CONSUMPTION  GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION
 GDP. YEAR-ON-YEAR RATE
%
2  CONTRIBUTIONS TO QUARTER-ON-QUARTER GROWTH
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.




BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2017 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
residents. At the same time, the prices of un subsidised housing, according to INE data, 
increased in Q4 by 4.5% year-on-year and by 0.4% with respect to the previous quarter, 
with the price increase in 2016 as a whole amounting to 4.7% (see Chart 11.4).
The most recent information on household borrowing costs does not show a clear trend. 
According to the latest information available, from January the average interest rate on 
new loans for house purchase stood at 2.2%, while that on consumer credit and other 
lending stood at 6.5% (see Chart 10). In the former segment there has recently been a 
change in the structure of the interest rate review periods for new loans, with those granted 
at a fixed rate gaining in weight (see Box 6). Since, at the present juncture, the cost of 
loans in this latter case is higher than the initial interest rate of variable rate loans, this 
change in composition translates into a certain rise in the indicator that measures the 
average cost of new loans to households for house purchase, which does not necessarily 
reflect a tightening of financial conditions in this segment.
As regards the volumes of new loans, following a certain moderation in their growth in 
2016 Q2, especially in the housing segment, there was a rise in activity in January. The 
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Reuters, Datastream, MSCI Blue Book, INE and Banco de España.
a The cost of equity is based on the three-stage Gordon dividend discount model.
b Credit includes off-balance sheet securitisation and loans transferred to Sareb.
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information from the latest editions of the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) suggests that the 
slowdown in the credit market in the second half of 2016 was mainly linked to demand 
factors, since, according to this source, there was a decline in the buoyancy of new 
applications in both segments.1 For 2017 Q1, banks expected, on the supply side, a slight 
tightening of credit standards in the case of loans for house purchase and no change in 
those for consumer credit and other lending and, on the demand side, an increase in credit 
applications in both segments. In terms of outstanding amounts, the increase in new loans 
in January contributed to a moderation in the year-on-year rate of decline of household 
debt, to 1.4%, from 1.6% in September. By type of loan, lending for house purchase 
continued to contract at the same year-on-year rate, of 3.1%, while the year-on-year 
growth of consumer credit and other lending accelerated from 3.9% in September to 4.5% 
in January.
Finally, the financial position of households continued to improve in the final quarter of 
2016. Thus, the debt ratio and the debt burden of households fell relative to their gross 
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disposable income (see Chart 12), as a result of the decline in their debt, the growth in 
their income and, in the latter case, the reduction in the average cost of their liabilities. 
The net wealth of households continued to expand, as a result of the increase in their 
real-estate and financial wealth, driven by the rise in the value of their assets and the 
decline in their liabilities. 
Business activity, approximated by the value added of the market economy, is estimated 
to have increased its growth rate slightly in Q1. The favourable tempo of activity at the 
beginning of the year seems to have been widespread across the different market sectors, 
except for agriculture (see Chart 13).
In the light of the contemporaneous information on industry and energy, growth of activity 
in this sector in Q1 may prove to be somewhat higher than in the final stretch of last year. 
In most cases the qualitative indicators continued to improve following a moderate 
weakening in mid-2016. Consequently, the European Commission’s industrial confidence 
indicator, the manufacturing PMI and order books, particularly orders from abroad, posted 
average levels in the period January-February which were higher than their respective 
averages in the previous three months. Similarly, quantitative indicators performed 
favourably, both the industrial production index (whose rise in January was underpinned 
by the more positive trend of the capital goods and energy components) and the social 
security registrations of this sector, (whose growth rate remained stable to February) in 
terms of the three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate (see Chart 13).
According to the latest information received on market services, growth in the activity of 
this sector in the early stages of the year seems to be similar to that observed in 2016 Q4. 
Of the qualitative indicators, the services PMI and the confidence indicator of this sector 
(compiled by the European Commission) in terms of their average for the first two months 
of the year were higher than their respective averages in the period October-December. 
3.2  Business activity  
and investment
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Last data point in each series is an estimate.
b Cumulative data from four quarters.
c Includes MFI lending and off-balance securitised lending.
d Estimate of interest payments and capital repayments.
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As for quantitative indicators, and according to State Tax Revenue Service figures, the 
sales of large corporations providing non-financial services remained robust, whereas the 
services business activity index lost some momentum in terms of the three-month moving 
quarter-on-quarter rate constructed with data to January. The rate of increase of social 
security registrations in this sector softened between December and February.
The growth rate of the value added of firms in the construction sector seems to have 
increased in Q1 in contrast with some deceleration in 2016 H2. Among the coincident 
indicators on intermediate consumption, cement consumption and industrial production 
of non-metallic minerals (both based on data to January) quickened, especially in the 
case of cement consumption. Likewise, the rate of increase of the number of social 
security registrations in this sector rose between December and February. By type of 
construction work, the most recent information on new housing approvals seems to 
point to a smaller increase in this segment, whereas the decline in government 
procurement in civil engineering projects eased. Overall, this information seems to 
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In this setting of positive developments in business activity as a whole, investment in 
capital goods is estimated to have gathered pace in 2017 Q1 to post a quarter-on-quarter 
rate of slightly less than 1% in contrast with its deceleration in 2016 H2. Thus, among the 
qualitative indicators, the industrial confidence index and the foreign order book of this 
sector continued to gain momentum in January and February. The manufacturing PMI and, 
to a greater degree, that of capital goods decelerated in February, although only in the 
case of capital goods is the average in Q1 slightly lower than in the preceding quarter. 
Quantitative indicators recovered somewhat after weakening in the second half of the past 
year. Therefore, in terms of the three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate, the IPI and 
capital goods imports gathered steam in January after showing some sluggishness in 
previous months. Similarly, the growth rate of commercial vehicle registrations increased 
between December and February (see Chart 13).
Information from recent months on the financing conditions of the corporate sector, in line 
with household financing developements does not show a clear trend in the average costs 
of new bank loans to non-financial corporations, aside from the usual variations. On the 
most recent data referring to January, the average interest rate on loans for less than 
€1 million, a segment in which SME transactions are essentially concentrated, stood at 
3.4%, while the average interest rate on loans above the foregoing figure was 1.7% (see 
Chart 10). By contrast, long-term market-based debt financing became slightly more 
expensive between December and February (up 11 bp to 2.3%), while the cost of equity 
financing remained stable over that period.
In this setting, the volume of new lending for amounts of less than €1 million rose slightly 
in 2016 Q4 in year-on-year terms, while that of loans for €1 million and more, mainly used 
by large corporations, continued to fall, albeit at a lower rate. In January there was an 
increase in activity in both segments. According to the latest edition of the BLS (2016 Q4), 
demand factors continued to explain the different trends in loans by amount in a setting in 
which lending standards remained unchanged. Therefore, according to the banks 
surveyed, requests for funds from SMEs increased during the last three months of 2016, 
whereas those from large corporations fell. As a result of these developments in activity on 
credit markets, the fall in the balances of bank loans to non-financial corporations eased 
from 1.3% in September to 1% in January. The breakdown by type of loan (available to 
2016 Q4) shows that the year-on-year rate of decline in credit extended to the construction 
sector remained at approximately 10% and the fall in loans for real estate services stepped 
up to 11.3% (from 10% in Q3). Conversely, the contraction in credit extended to industry 
and other services in that period eased by 0.5 pp and 3.1 pp to 3% and 0.5%, respectively.
The lower demand for bank credit by large corporations is linked, in part, to the greater 
appeal of market-based debt financing; the issuance of which rose in recent months. In 
particular, debt securities financing, including debt securities issued by non-resident 
subsidiaries, showed more dynamism between September and January (its rate of increase 
rose by 2.5 pp to 8.6%). Consequently, financing obtained through fixed-income issues 
and bank loans extended by resident institutions switched to posting slightly positive 
growth rates in January.
Lastly, the balance sheet position of firms continued to improve in the last three months of 
2016. In particular, the debt ratio and interest burden as a percentage of GDP continued to 
decline, boosted by the increase in GDP, the fall in debt and, in the case of the interest 
burden, also due to the decrease in the average cost of debt (see Chart 14). According to 
the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (with information from 2016), as a 
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result of the upward trend in activity together with the favourable performance of financial 
costs and revenues, the ordinary profits of sample firms grew at a high rate which led to a 
further increase in aggregate ordinary profitability indicators.
Based on the limited information available - referring only to January - net external demand 
is estimated to have made a slightly positive contribution to the quarter-on-quarter growth 
of GDP in the first quarter of the year, in line with the previous quarter. These developments 
are seemingly against a backdrop of quickening foreign trade in goods and services 
following its upturn in 2016 Q4. Trade transactions with the rest of the world are also 
estimated to have increased their year-on-year growth rate in 2017 Q1 (see Chart 15).
Customs data for January showed that foreign trade stepped up in a context characterised 
by the usual volatility of these series. Real goods exports climbed by 16.5% in January on 
a year-on-year basis, which was notably higher than their growth rate in December and in 
3.3  The external sector 
and balance of 
payments
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Interest-bearing borrowing.
b The last data point in each series is an estimate.
c The GDP data series is seasonally adjusted.
d Gross operating profit (GOP) plus financial revenue (FR).
e Defined as total inflation-adjusted asssets less non-interest bearing liabilities.
f Defined as ordinary net profit / net assets.
g Indicators calculated on the basis of annual CBSO data, or of quarterly data where no annual data are available. A value of more (less) than 100 denotes higher 
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2016 Q4 (2.5% and 4.3%, respectively). This quickening, albeit widespread across the 
different product types, was sharper in capital and intermediate goods; noteworthy, in 
particular, among the latter was the acceleration of energy goods. By geographical area, 
exports to the EU and, to a greater degree, those to the rest of the world were most 
buoyant in January. Similarly, real goods imports accelerated considerably in January to 
reach a year-on-year rate of increase of 11.2% (2.8% in December, which was close to the 
rate for 2016 Q4 as a whole). By product group, the higher growth of imports also influenced 
the different product types with energy quickening more noticeably.
On the most recent information relating to the first two months of the year, inbound 
tourism seems to have remained highly robust in early 2017, a characteristic it displayed 
throughout last year, buoyed by the redistribution of tourism flows due to geopolitical 
instability in certain geographical areas2. In particular, overnight stays in hotels and 
inflows of foreign tourists continued to record strong year-on-year growth rates, 
noteworthy was the vigour of certain major tourism-generating markets, such as the 
United Kingdom and other traditionally less relevant markets, such as Italy and the United 
States. Likewise, nominal tourist expenditure is estimated to have maintained the 
buoyancy observed in recent months.
The net lending of the Spanish economy has continued to expand recently. Specifically, 
the surplus on the balance of payments stood in 2016 at 2.1% of GDP, 0.1 pp higher than 
in 2015. This widening is mainly explained by the reduction in the energy deficit, which is 
linked to lower oil prices for most of 2016 compared with 2015, and, to a lesser degree, 
the improvement in the income deficit which is related to the decline in interest rates. 
Despite the strength of foreign tourist arrivals, at historical highs, there has been no 
improvement in the tourism balance owing to the higher outbound tourism expenditure of 
Spanish residents. The increase in the current-account surplus had little effect on net 
lending as it was offset by a decline in the surplus on capital account.
The information on cross-border financial flows of 2016 Q4, excluding the transactions of the 
Banco de España, shows that residents decreased their liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
by €5.4 billion, as a result of a reduction in the other investment balance which was higher than 
the increase of portfolio and direct investment liabilities. In turn, resident agents’ assets abroad 
rose by €16.2 billion, an increase which was distributed across the various headings. Thus, the 
net balance of the financial account (the difference between the net change in assets and in 
liabilities), excluding the Banco de España, turned positive again and reached €21.5 billion. 
These developments continued to be greatly affected by the private sector’s financing capacity 
and the Eurosystem’s liquidity provision policy. Since the balance of cross-border financial 
transactions was once again higher than the nation’s net lending in that period, this was 
reflected in a further increase of the Banco de España’s debit position vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. Spain’s overall net financial flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world were also positive, 
amounting to 3.1% of GDP (7.9%, excluding the Banco de España). The resident sectors 
made net investments in assets in the rest of the world at the same time as they reduced their 
liabilities vis-à-vis the external sector, excluding the central bank (see Chart 16).
As for the international investment position, the latest information for 2016 Q3 shows that 
the net debit position of the economy rose by €13.2 billion compared with the previous 
quarter. In terms of GDP, this made for a figure of 88.7% in 2012, 0.4 pp up on June. The 
2  See Box 7 of this Bulletin.
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net debit balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world increased because the net financial 
transactions during the period, amounting to €8.5 billion, were not sufficient to offset the 
unfavourable impact of other flows, amounting to €21.7  billion. Other flows essentially 
reflected the striking appreciation of the liabilities issued by resident agents and held by 
foreign investors, particularly those linked to equity instruments. Conversely, the nation’s 
gross external debt fell by 0.2 pp in terms of GDP to 171.2%.
Social security registrations remained highly buoyant until February which resulted in 
growth of 0.8% in terms of the three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate, which was 
slightly lower than the increase in Q4. By activity, the moderation of the growth rate of 
registrations reflected the easing in services activity across the board and that in agriculture, 
in particular. Overall, this information would suggest employment growth in 2017 Q1 of 
approximately 0.8% in QNA terms, in contrast with the moderate rise of 0.4% in the 
preceding quarter. Employment could grow at a slightly higher rate in the market economy 
than in the whole economy (see Charts 17.1 and 17.2).
The rate of decline of unemployment registered by the National Public Employment Service 
(SEPE by its Spanish abbreviation) increased slightly between December and February in 
terms of the three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate. The contracts registered at 
SEPE quickened in the first two months of the year, reaching a year-on-year growth rate of 
11.2% on average in this period (compared with 7.1% in 2016 Q4). Permanent contracts 
remained more buoyant than temporary ones, with average year-on-year increases in the 
January-February period of 14% and 10.9%, respectively, and, consequently, the share of 
permanent contracts in total contracts rose to 10.4% in February, 0.3 pp up on a year earlier.
As for wages, the information on collective bargaining to February indicates a year-on-year 
increase in wage rates of 1.2% in the agreements reached until that date, representing a 
slightly higher increase that the rate of 1.1% agreed for the whole of 2016. The 
3.4 The labour market
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative quarterly data.
b Sign changed.
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agreements reached in the first two months cover slightly more than 3.5 million 
employees, a similar figure compared to the same period of the previous year. As so little 
time has elapsed in 2017, practically all of these employees are subject to multi-year 
agreements entered into in previous years for which the average increase in wage rates 
stood at 1.2%. The newly signed agreements account for hardly 0.8% of employees with 
agreements in force and for which the wage settlement amounts to 1.4%3. Other wage 
indicators showed very moderate increases. Thus, average gross compensation at large 
corporations grew by 0.2% in year-on-year terms in January after falling slightly in Q4 
(-0.1%). In QNA terms, compensation per employee for the whole economy increased in 
Q4 by 0.1% year-on-year, and this change was zero in the market economy following a 
year and a half of declines. In 2017 Q1 compensation is expected to quicken to some 
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3  Contrary to other years, this year no agreement with wage recommendations has been reached so far between 
the social agents, which could delay the progress of collective bargaining at the beginning of this year.
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In 2017 Q1 it is estimated that the import deflator will quicken notably, largely owing to the 
rise in the prices of oil and other commodities on international markets with respect to their 
levels a year earlier. Likewise, the year-on-year growth rate of domestic producer prices, 
approximated by the GDP deflator, will foreseeably increase in Q1, albeit less sharply than 
in the case of imported goods prices (see Chart 18).
The CPI’s year-on-year rate of change reached 3% in February, its highest level since 
October 2012 and 1.4 pp higher than in December (see Chart 18). Recent developments 
in overall inflation have been influenced considerably by the rising trend in energy prices 
as a result of the higher prices of electricity and oil derivatives, as well as by the comparison 
effects associated with previous declines in these prices4. The year-on-year growth rate of 
the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy stood at 1% in February, the same as in 
December. As for its components, the year-on-year growth rate of services and processed 
food prices eased by 0.3 pp and 0.2 pp to 1.3% and 0%, respectively, between December 
and February. The year-on-year growth rate of non-energy industrial goods prices stood at 
3.5  Price developments
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
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4  See Box 3 of the Quarterly Report on the Spanish economy in the Economic Bulletin of the Banco de España, 
December 2016, and Box 4 of this bulletin.
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0.6%, the same as in December. These consumer price developments took place against 
a background of very small increases in national producer prices and in the prices of non-
energy industrial goods imports, although for processed food the rises were more 
prominent, especially in terms of import prices.
As for the more volatile consumer price components, energy prices quickened sharply 
between December and February, which represented an increase in their year-on-year rate 
of change of almost 12 pp to 16.8%. This performance reflected increases in heating and 
vehicle fuel prices as well as rises in electricity and gas prices which were generally sharper 
than in January. In turn, the CPI excluding unprocessed food accelerated between 
December and February, as a result its year-on-year rate of change rose by more than 3 pp 
to 5.4%. The recent rise in fresh fruit and vegetable prices had a particular impact on these 
developments.
Between December and February, the year-on-year rates of change in the HICP in Spain 
and the euro area climbed by 1.6 pp and 0.9 pp to 3% and 2%, respectively. Consequently, 
the inflation differential, which had been favourable to Spain prior to December, turned 
positive in that month and widened to 1 pp in February, mainly in response to the higher 
rise in energy prices in Spain than in the euro area. The change in the differential in terms 
of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy was of a much smaller magnitude, 
nevertheless, it turned positive to stand at 0.2 pp (-0.1 pp in December). Among the core 
inflation components, the differential in non-energy industrial goods (favourable to Spain) 
turned positive, which the widening of the differential in processed food and services 
(favourable to Spain) failed to offset.
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SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLD FINANCES (EFF) 2014: METHODS, RESULTS AND 
CHANGES SINCE 2011
Published on 24 January 2017
This article presents the main results of the Survey of Household Finances 2014, which show the 
financial position of Spanish households at the end of 2014. It also describes the most significant 
changes observed in the period from end-2011 to end-2014.
MACROECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY: MEASUREMENT AND IMPACT ON THE SPANISH 
ECONOMY
María Gil, Javier J. Pérez and Alberto Urtasun
Published on 2 February 2017
This article characterises the level of uncertainty in the Spanish economy. Various indicators are 
analysed, distinguishing their source: financial market volatility, degree of disagreement between 
agents on the economic situation and economic policy uncertainty. 
Aggregate uncertainty in the Spanish economy increased in 2016, although it remained at levels 
below the average for the 2008-2013 recession. 
The changes in uncertainty captured by financial indicators are shown to have a higher impact 
on economic activity, and particularly on investment. 
Finally, it is illustrated how a significant part of the macroeconomic effect of the heightened 
uncertainty in the past year originated outside the Spanish economy.
TOWARDS EFFICIENT CAPITAL FLOW MANAGEMENT
Ángel Estrada, Luis Molina, Paula Sánchez and Francesca Viani
Published on 9 February 2017
Financial globalisation has advanced notably in recent decades. In principle, greater integration 
should raise the degree of economic efficiency. However, the empirical evidence suggests that, 
for this to occur, countries should have well-designed economic institutions and sufficiently 
developed local financial markets. Moreover, these flows may jeopardise financial stability in 
certain circumstances, whereby the economic authorities need to draw on criteria and instruments 
to withstand such situations. These tools should be used as part of a broader programme of 
measures that includes the macro and microeconomic adjustments required. Furthermore, 
international cooperation emerges as a necessary complement to globalisation.
SERVICES REGULATION, INPUT PRICES AND EXPORTS
Mónica Correa-López
Published on 16 February 2017
This article analyses the economic implications of a change in the regulatory framework designed 
to promote competition among firms, assessing the impact that barriers to competition in the 
services industry have on the cost of inputs and the exports of manufacturing firms in Spain. 
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The estimates presented reveal that the reductions in barriers to competition over recent decades 
have had a significant impact on the real exports of manufacturing firms, especially larger ones, 
as a result of greater competition in the supply of their inputs. 
The results underline the fact that further improvements in the degree of competition may 
influence the competitiveness of the Spanish economy as a whole.
GLOBAL FUNDING TRENDS IN CAPITAL MARKETS IN 2016
Alberto Fuertes, José Manuel Marqués and Luis Molina
Published on 23 February 2017
Bond issuance increased moderately in the developed markets in 2016, partly due to the ongoing 
fiscal consolidation in the main economies. Placements by companies with better credit quality 
and by the banking sector were notably buoyant. 
Across countries, however, there were significant differences, both in terms of the conditions of 
supply of bonds by issuers (the cyclical position of each economy, the need for deleveraging by 
businesses and the public sector, and the regulatory requirements in the financial sector) and in 
terms of the factors affecting the demand of investors (risk appetite, the search for yield in a 
context of negative interest rates and the role of central banks in bond purchases). 
With regard to the emerging economies, they continued to have access to the markets. However, 
the volatility observed in foreign exchange markets led to a certain preference for foreign-
currency issuance, especially in US dollars.
THE NATURAL INTEREST RATE: CONCEPT, DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR MONETARY POLICY
Alessandro Galesi, Galo Nuño and Carlos Thomas
Published on 2 March 2017
This article defines the natural interest rate, analysing the concept and its role in monetary policy 
conduct. 
Estimates of the natural interest rate place it at historically low and even negative levels. Demographics 
and growth, but also the recent financial crisis with weak aggregate demand, deleveraging, etc., are 
identified as factors related to this decline. 
Lastly, the article highlights the difficulties that a natural rate of this type may pose to central banks in 
achieving their objectives, and it discusses potential monetary policy-related solutions, such as QE 
and changes in the monetary policy objective. 
SITUATION OF AND OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY AT THE START OF 2017
Associate Directorate General International Affairs
Published on 16 March 2017
Global growth in 2016 disappointed analysts once again. Moreover, three far-reaching events 
occurred which, nevertheless, did not have an immediate major impact. 
At the start of the year, the Chinese financial markets experienced turbulence relating to the 
challenges the Chinese authorities face in implementing their structural reform programme. 
In June, the United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the European Union, which means the 
loss of an influential partner in the process of European construction. 
Lastly, in November, the Republican candidate Donald Trump won the US presidential elections. 
This might entail a change in macroeconomic policies and check the process of globalisation. 
These events reveal a global economic setting shrouded in great uncertainty for the future.
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RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS: SUMMARY 2016 YEAR-END DATA
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 22 March 2017
Most sectors and companies in the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey saw an 
expansion in productive activity and employment in 2016. 
Buoyant activity, coupled with favourable trends in financial costs and revenues, enabled companies’ 
ordinary profits to grow rapidly. This meant a further increase in aggregate levels of ordinary profits. 
Lastly, companies’ financial position continued to strengthen, translating into a drop in indebtedness 
and debt burden ratios. 
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POPULATION OF SPAIN: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND PROJECTIONS
Pilar Cuadrado
Published on 19 January 2017
CHANGES IN THE DEGREE OF FINANCIAL PRESSURE BORNE BY SPANISH  
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS: 2007-2016
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 9 March 2017
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The Banco de España publishes various types of documents providing information on its 
activity (economic reports, statistics, research papers, etc.). The full list of Banco de España 
publications can be found on its website at http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publica-
ciones/Relacionados/Fic/Catalogopublicaciones.pdf.
The list of articles published in the Economic Bulletin since 1990 can be consulted at http://
www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/BoletinEconomico/
indice_general_ingles.pdf.
Most of these documents are available in pdf format and can be downloaded free of charge 
from the Banco de España website at http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/informes/. 
Requests for others should be addressed to publicaciones@bde.es.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using 
the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
ABS Asset-backed securities
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE	 Official	State	Gazette




CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP	 Excessive	Deficit	Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA	 Official	Spanish	Labour	Force	Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT	 Statistical	Office	of	the	European	Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF	 Gross	fixed	capital	formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP	 Gross	operating	profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO	 Official	Credit	Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE	 National	Audit	Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs	 Longer-term	refinancing	operations
MFIs	 Monetary	financial	institutions
MIP Macroeconomic imbalance procedure
MMFs Money market funds
MROs	 Main	refinancing	operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAIRU	 Non-accelerating	inflation	rate	of	unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs	 Non-financial	corporations
NPBs National Productivity Boards
NPISHs	 Non-profit	institutions	serving	households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OJ	L	 Official	Journal	of	the	European	Union	(Legislation)
ONP	 Ordinary	net	profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPEE National Public Employment Service
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs	 Targeted	longer-tem	refinancing	operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.







of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0	 Less	than	half	the	final	digit	shown	in	the	series.
